

# CURRENT *History*

A MONTHLY MAGAZINE  
OF WORLD AFFAIRS

FEBRUARY 1963

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March, 1963

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### India and China

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### Political Trends In India

by NORMAN D. PALMER, Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania, and author of *The Indian Political System*;

### India's Agricultural Potential

by HENRY MADDICK, Lecturer in Public Administration, Birmingham University;

### India's Industrial Progress

by WILFRED MALENBAUM, South Asia Regional Studies, University of Pennsylvania.

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# CURRENT History

FEBRUARY, 1963

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*Our February issue is devoted to a study of the nations of Latin America. How have cold war tensions influenced our "neighbors to the south"? Eight articles examine the patterns of growth in Latin America. The introductory article reviews Latin America's relations with the United States. This specialist writes that "The Cuban crisis revealed again the subordinate position of Latin American countries in international affairs. . . . But Latin America could not escape this dispute. The Soviet Union had made Castro its pawn, and the struggle of the great powers over Cuba involved the entire Western Hemisphere."*

## Cold War Drift in Latin America

PAUL S. HOLBO

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SOVIET COMMUNISM, the Common Market, Communist China's activities, and crises elsewhere in the world have intruded upon the consciences of Latin America in recent months, but not deeply. The international outlook of Latin Americans continues to be limited largely to the Western Hemisphere, and their primary concern is with the United States' attitude and actions towards them. Latin American countries rarely have been able to initiate positive foreign policies, either individually or collectively. They are acted upon. They do not ordinarily influence events outside their boundaries.

The histories of most Latin American nations reveal their defensive circumstances, weakness, and divisions. In the 1820's, the new republics failed to make alliances with the United States, cooperate with each other, or even attend the Congress of Panama and other early conferences. Despite a series of foreign blockades, invasions, and other inter-

ventions in the 1840's, the five South American countries which sent delegates to a second inter-American conference did not ratify a proposed treaty for mutual military aid. Twenty years later, a treaty of defense was ratified, but it provided no help for Mexico, then ruled by Maximilian. With few exceptions, in the nineteenth century the nations of Latin America were isolated and impotent in their international relations.

The evolution of mutual action by the Americas was painful and sporadic. Progress towards cooperation was due largely to the leadership of the United States.

Several congresses of Latin American nations met after 1865 to discuss common problems such as health, commerce, and international law. The United States was not invited to attend, and little was accomplished. But Secretary of States James G. Blaine presided over the Pan-American Congress of 1889-1890 in Washington that created the International Union of American Republics

and the Bureau of American Republics, later renamed the Pan-American Union.

The delegates to the next five meetings wrangled repeatedly over the aggressive policies of the Colossus of the North. A surge of American interventions and economic investments in Latin America after 1895 increased a tendency among its residents, notably among intellectuals, to criticize the United States severely. But Pan-Americanism, including *norteamericanos*, survived until 1928, then flourished under the Good Neighbor policies of Herbert Hoover and Franklin D. Roosevelt.

The hemisphere reached another milestone in 1936. Since the turn of the century, when the United States halted coercive European action against Venezuela, American arms had protected Latin America from foreign intervention. Because of the rising menace of European dictators, President Franklin D. Roosevelt asked the delegates to the special conference at Buenos Aires to "multilateralize" the Monroe Doctrine.

The conference resolved "that every act susceptible of disturbing the peace of America affects each and every one" of the American nations. The Declaration of Buenos Aires was not a treaty, and its provisions for consultation in a crisis were neither clear nor binding. But the Eighth Inter-American Conference at Lima in 1938 strengthened the idea of consultation by providing for meetings of foreign ministers.

The resulting Acts of Panama of 1939 and Havana of 1940 corresponded closely to the foreign policy of the United States. The former, which was in the spirit of the isolationist neutrality laws, created a "safety-belt" around the hemisphere; the latter endorsed the United States' venerable no-transfer principle by barring other non-American (Axis) powers from acquiring existing European colonies. President Roosevelt emphasized defense of the hemisphere to win the confidence and support of Latin America.

To insure cooperation during the war, the United States increased its use of diplomatic and economic pressure. As a result, by March, 1945, only Argentina had not declared war against at least one of the Axis

nations. A number of Latin American countries furnished air and naval bases, valuable raw materials, and some military units to the Allies. President Roosevelt remarked delightedly that the Good Partner had replaced the Good Neighbor. The United States reciprocated with over \$500 million in lend-lease and additional loans, gifts, military missions, and technical help. An Inter-American Defense Board also was established.

## POST-WAR DISILLUSION

At the peak of amity, discontent appeared in Latin America over the results of cooperating with the United States. Many persons complained that their big neighbor was neglecting them economically. Other critics deplored specific American diplomatic policies, or lack of policies. Subsequently, friends of Latin America in the United States, including a number of scholars, mourned the passing of Pan-Americanism.

There was some basis for pessimism. Departing sharply from their previous attitude, Latin Americans, who had learned to appreciate material strength and abundance, requested that the United States undertake a generous dollar diplomacy—partly, they explained, in compensation for their sacrifice of profits during wartime. They asked for aid without obligations or supervision, which they feared would become a subtle new form of American intervention.

The Truman administration gave first priority to European recovery and reminded Latin America bluntly that it had escaped the ravages of war. The President's chief advisers on foreign policy, including Dean Acheson, George Kennan, and Charles Bohlen, were primarily interested in Soviet-American relations, not in the Western Hemisphere. Acheson consistently advocated two geo-political ideas alien to Pan-Americanism: the importance of power and the centrality of Europe in international relations. President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles likewise directed the attention of the United States to areas immediately threatened by communism.

As a result, Latin America received a relatively limited amount of aid. In 1948, when



the Latin American delegates to the Ninth Inter-American Conference requested a "little Marshall Plan," the United States offered \$500 million. The modest proposal aroused deep resentment. Altogether, between 1948 and 1955, the United States provided \$1.2 billion to Latin America, primarily in credits. This was less than one-third of the financial assistance granted to the Near East and Africa, less than one-fifth of the amount sent to Asian countries, and far less than Europe received. Adding insult to injury, the United States transferred economic experts from Latin American embassies to posts in other countries.

The death of Franklin D. Roosevelt and lessened danger from Europe contributed to the Latin Americans' new fears and truculence. They condemned the United States for practicing racial segregation and sending Protestant missionaries to Latin America; for creating inflation and making labor scarce through wartime programs; for evacuating some military bases too abruptly and remaining in others too long; for causing shortages of goods and wearing out the railroads of one country by buying its products for the war effort.<sup>1</sup>

Another series of events revealed a fundamental contradiction in the inter-American system and caused endless, bitter recriminations. The essence of the Good Neighbor policy was non-intervention by the United States in the internal affairs of Latin America. Unhappily, at the end of the war, authoritarian governments ruled in a dozen countries. Some democrats in those nations hoped and anticipated that the United States would help to oust the despotic regimes.

However, opposition to intervention continued to have greater political appeal in Latin America. When the Department of State denounced Nazi infiltration in Argen-

tina in the Blue Book of 1946, Juan Perón countered by charging interference in his country's elections. The United States' later display of friendliness towards Perón and Rafael Trujillo, whom President Truman's ambassador to the Dominican Republic praised effusively, provoked an even greater outcry. Latin Americans also reacted angrily when President Eisenhower's ambassador to Cuba publicly embraced a notorious aide of Fulgencio Batista and protested with vehemence the award of citations to General Manuel Odría of Peru and Colonel Marcos Pérez Jiménez of Venezuela, the "Himmler of the Hemisphere."

Inept American envoys were responsible for certain of these diplomatic errors. However, the cold war underlay the dealings with dictators. The United States repeatedly warned its neighbors of danger. At Bogotá in 1948, Secretary of State George Marshall secured a condemnation of "the political activity of international communism." Upon the outbreak of the Korean War, the United States offered military aid and requested that each member of the recently-formed Organization of American States contribute to the defense of the hemisphere.<sup>2</sup> At Caracas in 1954, Secretary of State Dulles pushed through a resolution declaring "that the domination or control of the political institutions of any American state by the international Communist movement" would constitute a threat to the Americas.

By 1953, the United States had negotiated seven mutual security pacts, and dictatorial regimes in Cuba, Peru, and Colombia aligned themselves against communism. The Eisenhower administration signed similar treaties with equally oppressive governments in the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua.

It soon became apparent that few persons other than right-wing dictators felt threatened by communism. Germán Arciniegas, a prominent Colombian democrat, stated in 1952, "In Latin America Communism is non-existent." He added that "the dictators describe as Communists all those who do not support them. According to General Odría, the people of Peru are Communists."<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Dozer, Donald, *Are We Good Neighbors?* University of Florida Press, Gainesville, 1959, pp. 196-210.

<sup>2</sup> The Central American countries, for instance, were asked to furnish an anti-aircraft battalion to protect the Panama Canal.

<sup>3</sup> Arciniegas, Germán, *The State of Latin America*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1952.

Mexico and Argentina abstained from voting on the Declaration of Caracas, and a delegate from Uruguay asserted that he had voted "without enthusiasm, without optimism, without joy and without feeling that we were contributing to the adoption of a constructive measure."<sup>4</sup> Many Latin Americans blamed the C.I.A. (Central Intelligence Agency) and Ambassador John E. ("Pistol-packing") Peurifoy for the revolution that ousted a Communist-backed regime in Guatemala later in 1954. Diego Rivera painted a mural portraying John Foster and Allen Dulles among the revolutionaries.<sup>5</sup>

Herbert L. Matthews of *The New York Times* expressed the typical Latin American view of the United States' foreign policy when he observed that "our obsession with the cold war led us into an over-emphasis on 'international communism.'"<sup>6</sup> A distinguished American historian suggested that hemispheric relations suffered from a more fundamental change. Arthur Whitaker argued that new conceptions of geography, the threat from Nazi Germany, and criticism by American interventionists of "continentalism" impaired the Western Hemisphere idea before 1941, and that post-war events destroyed its remaining validity.<sup>7</sup>

Jorge Basadre commented gloomily that "this obituary" implied that "the Latin American people should be considered . . . as old schoolmates, a bunch of kids born on the wrong side of the tracks, who, therefore must continue to be treated as the 'orphans of the

cold war.'"<sup>8</sup> Basadre contended that Latin America was important to the United States and that it needed understanding and material assistance.<sup>9</sup> Daniel Cosío Villegas of Mexico urged the two Americas to "grasp at the first possible moment for reconciliation."<sup>10</sup>

### A POLICY OF DRIFT

The United States slowly realized that its neighbors confronted immediate dangers. Some seeming signs of Communist activity were misleading, but constant tension in the Caribbean and outbreaks of anti-Americanism in Brazil and Venezuela revealed deep unrest. Milton S. Eisenhower reported to President Eisenhower after an extended trip in 1953 that "a tremendous social ferment exists today throughout Latin America."<sup>11</sup> Agitators constantly exploited the weakness of the shaky new democratic governments in Argentina, Colombia, and Venezuela.

American aid was increased, especially after 1955; and the Development Loan Fund, established in 1957, promised to render substantial additional help. But the resources of the United States were limited. The unwillingness of Latin American countries to curb inflation and free their economies nullified the effect of the assistance.

From 1958 until the Cuban crisis threatened the world with thermonuclear destruction, the inter-American system continued to drift. Latin America did not respond to the United States' pleas for self-help and economic reform. Conferences of the O.A.S. on important political issues proved equally frustrating.

The first crisis occurred in mid-1958, when radical students and mobs of slum-dwellers heckled and assaulted Vice-President Richard Nixon during his tour of South America. Nixon later advised the United States to accord a formal handshake to dictators and to reserve the *abrazo* (embrace) for democratic leaders.

When President Eisenhower announced a new economic program on July 11, 1960, he made it clear that Latin America would have to contribute, that the Inter-American Development Bank would administer the funds,

<sup>4</sup> Campbell, John C., *The United States in World Affairs, 1954*, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 1954, pp. 373-381.

<sup>5</sup> Beal, John R., *John Foster Dulles*, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1957, p. 235.

<sup>6</sup> Matthews, Herbert L. (ed.), *The United States and Latin America*, The American Assembly, New York, 1959, p. 161.

<sup>7</sup> Whitaker, Arthur, *The Western Hemisphere Idea: Its Rise and Decline*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1961.

<sup>8</sup> Basadre, Jorge, Review of *The Western Hemisphere Idea*, *Hispanic American Historical Review* (May, 1955), pp. 284-286.

<sup>9</sup> Cosío Villegas, Daniel, *Change in Latin America: The Mexican and Cuban Revolutions*, The University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 1961, p. 54.

<sup>10</sup> Eisenhower, Milton S., *Report to the President: United States-Latin American Relations*, Department of State Publication 5290, November 18, 1953.

and that private enterprise would finance most of the activities. Congress authorized the expenditure of \$500 million as an "earnest" of our good intentions. Brazil complained loudly at the arrangements, and Cuba asserted that the United States had no interest in the progress of Latin America. However, 19 nations, all except Cuba, which voted "no," and the Dominican Republic, which was not represented) signed the Act of Bogotá, a design for social and economic development, dependent upon basic reforms in administration, tax structure, and laws of land tenure.

### ACT OF BOGOTA

President Kennedy, who termed the Act of Bogotá "an historic turning point," asked Congress in March, 1961, to appropriate the money it had promised. He, too, insisted on "self-help and domestic reform." Repeating these conditions, the President set forth a ten-year plan of "Alliance for Progress," to "transform the Nineteen Sixties into an historic decade."<sup>11</sup> The initial reaction in Latin America was mixed. There was a feeling in Mexico, for example, that nothing new could be expected. However, representatives of 20 nations met at Punta del Este, Uruguay in August, 1961, and worked out a charter for *Alianza para el progreso*, a sweeping scheme costing \$20 billion, to "end those conditions which benefit the few at the expense of the needs and the dignity of the many."

The eclipse of Presidents Quadros of Brazil and Frondizi of Argentina, whom the United States had counted upon, held up the pro-

gram. Other delays followed. The United States demanded that Latin America enact reforms and called for careful economic planning. Few nations were able to comply. "We haven't got enough people who can make the kind of studies the United States is demanding," one Central American president exclaimed. Economist Raymond F. Mikesell informed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the plans he had examined were "little more than intellectual exercises . . . from inadequate data." He also asserted that the missions of the Agency for International Development were not prepared to carry out a program of assistance in development.<sup>12</sup>

Teodoro Moscoso, the energetic coordinator of the Alliance for Progress, told Congress that most funds were being spent to cover pressing deficits in Latin America's balance of payments, not for development. After the first year of operations—in which the United States committed \$1,029,576,000 (over one-third went to Brazil)—Moscoso announced candidly that the Alliance's record scarcely warranted "celebration." Echoing recent sharp criticism from Bolivia and Colombia, he admitted that progress towards agrarian and fiscal reform had been "spotty," and that the program had encountered "staggering and frustrating" obstacles.<sup>13</sup>

Meanwhile, Latin Americans complained about the lack of American leadership. The nine "wise men" of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council reported to the finance ministers at Mexico City in October, 1962, that the Alliance has "not yet had the political and psychological impact that it should have provoked."

The hemisphere made equally little progress in repairing its diplomatic fences. At San José, Costa Rica, in August, 1960, the foreign ministers "emphatically" censured Rafael Trujillo. But eight countries—including Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Uruguay—defended a far greater menace, the Cuban government, whose delegates arrived bristling with revolutionary propaganda and revolvers. The conference condemned Communist aggression in the Americas without mentioning any country. Contradicting the

<sup>11</sup> *New York Times*, March 15, 1961.

<sup>12</sup> Mikesell, Raymond F., *United States-Latin American Relations: Some Observations on the Operation of the Alliance for Progress: the First Six Months*, Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 87299, August 3, 1962.

<sup>13</sup> *San Francisco Chronicle*, August 12, 1962; *New York Times*, October 21, 22, 1962. Beginning in the summer of 1962, the United States Peace Corps increased its emphasis on Latin America, partly because of the Cuban situation. In December, 1962, the agency was operating in 13 countries. By June, 1963, more than 2,200 "poor gringos" will be working in Latin America, more than in any other area of the world. *New York Times*, December 3, 1962.

claims of Secretary of State Christian Herter, Foreign Minister Manuel Tello of Mexico intoned that in no way did the resolution "constitute a condemnation or a threat against Cuba."<sup>14</sup>

Meanwhile, Fidel Castro, the demagogic dictator of Cuba, expropriated American property, repeatedly insulted the United States, initiated trade and diplomatic relations with the Soviet bloc, and undertook subversion throughout the Caribbean and Central America. In retaliation, the United States cut Cuba's generous sugar quota, embargoed most shipments to the island, except food and medicine, and severed diplomatic relations. Ill-feeling reached a second crisis in April, 1961, when Castro easily repulsed a clumsy invasion by Cuban refugees which the United States had encouraged.

After the abortive invasion at Bahía de Cochinos in April, 1961, the Inter-American Defense Board voted to exclude Cuba, though Mexico, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Chile abstained. And the United States secured postponement of the long-planned Eleventh Inter-American Conference, which would have strangled in fruitless debate. At the eighth meeting of foreign ministers in January, 1962, the O.A.S. expelled Cuba. But months of preparatory talks were necessary; and Secretary of State Dean Rusk had to bargain vigorously to secure the necessary 14 votes.

Uruguay signed partly in reaction to contrary pressure from "neutralist" Argentina, which opposed the resolution, as did Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Ecuador, and Bolivia. The conference agreed unanimously that adher-

ence to Marxism-Leninism was incompatible with the inter-American system. However, four of the "soft six" abstained on the resolution to embargo trade in arms with Cuba. Few observers of the conference at Punta del Este concurred with the glowing reports of unity that the United States delegation announced.<sup>15</sup>

By September, preoccupation with subversion and propaganda from Cuba paralyzed several Central American governments. In South America, Argentina shifted towards the position of the United States, but most of the continent was not greatly concerned about Cuba and opposed intervention.<sup>16</sup>

### THE CUBAN CRISIS

The third crisis represented the greatest foreign threat to the Western Hemisphere since 1941, or even since 1823. It began in August, 1960, when Premier Khrushchev promised Cuba the support of "Soviet artillerymen" with "rocket fire." Castro, who boasted on May 1, 1961, that his country was a "socialist state" and announced a few months later that he was a "Marxist-Leninist until the last day of my life," repeatedly exhorted his countrymen to prepare for an American invasion.<sup>17</sup> By 1962, he had secured sufficient jet aircraft and modern military equipment from Communist sources to command the most powerful armed forces in the Caribbean.<sup>18</sup>

There also were disturbing rumors that Russians were constructing missile sites on the island. The Kennedy administration belatedly confirmed the presence of Soviet "technicians" and "defensive missiles." But the President denied knowledge of "offensive" installations until October 22, 1962, when the United States produced convincing photographs of such missiles and assault bombers. Premier Khrushchev admitted that there were nuclear warheads in Cuba, under his personal control.<sup>19</sup>

Early in October, following passage of a Congressional resolution authorizing the use of arms against Communist "aggressive or subversive activities," the United States had attempted again to arouse its allies. Meeting

<sup>14</sup> *Hispanic American Report* (August, 1960), pp. 572-574. The conference rejected the United States' proposal for supervised elections in the Dominican Republic as "intervention."

<sup>15</sup> *Hispanic American Report* (March, 1962), pp. 71, 79-82.

<sup>16</sup> *New York Times*, October 22, 1962. The foreign minister of one Central American country confided to a reporter that his government "confiscated a lot of propaganda material that pours in by air freight, but we know that tons of it are coming in annually by truck."

<sup>17</sup> *New York Times*, July 10, 1960, May 2, 1961.

<sup>18</sup> Handleman, Howard, "Castro's Fighting Power: A Report from Close Up," *United States News and World Report*, February 12, 1962.

<sup>19</sup> *New York Times*, September 14, October 12, 23, November 17, 1962.





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informally at the Department of State, the foreign ministers expressed their "extraordinary solidarity," denounced the "Sino-Soviet intervention in Cuba," and called for "the adoption of special measures, both individual and collective." Secretary Rusk and his aides derived more solace from the unanimity of the vote than from the strength of the resolution. While the ministers conferred on possible diplomatic action, the Kennedy administration renewed its efforts to curtail European trade with Cuba. Several congressmen proposed that the United States move against Cuba if the O.A.S. failed to act by a specified time.

A few days later, Moscow denied reports emanating from the United Nations that Premier Khrushchev would modify his position supporting Cuba in return for concessions on Berlin.<sup>20</sup> The Soviet Union apparently hoped to obtain a voice in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere. This decision made Latin America the stake of international conflict for the first time in recent history.

The United States reacted vigorously to the Soviet Union's challenge. President Kennedy, who was unable to count on the O.A.S., unilaterally imposed a blockade and demanded the withdrawal of Russian missiles and bombers from Cuba. However, he informed the Latin American governments of his intentions and asked at once for a meeting of the organ of consultation.<sup>21</sup> Hours later, Latin America fell into line as it had not done since 1945 and voted 19 to 0 to authorize "the use of armed force" in the quarantine (Uruguay's delegate lacked instructions). Argentina, Colombia, and Venezuela reportedly offered to assist in the blockade. Six Central American countries made available bases and installations.

Such unity was gratifying, but deceptive

and momentary. Brazil, Mexico, and Bolivia abstained on a resolution to "prevent" the missiles in Cuba from becoming an "active threat." When the United States urged that measures be taken to counter "subversion" from Cuba, several countries resumed their opposition to "intervention," and Mexico argued that there was no authority for such actions. While some Central Americans called for the overthrow of Castro, Brazil favored negotiating a *modus vivendi* with him. At the end of 1962, Latin America was as divided as ever.

The Cuban crisis revealed again the subordinate position of Latin American countries in international affairs. Because they could not agree and would not follow the leadership of the United States, the O.A.S. continued to appear incapable of acting decisively on major issues. Consequently, the United States answered the Soviet thrust alone. But Latin America could not escape this dispute. The Soviet Union had made Castro its pawn, and the struggle of the great powers over Cuba involved the entire Western Hemisphere. Premier Khrushchev's decision to remove the objectionable missiles and bombers further exposed Cuba's status as a Communist satellite.

### PATTERNS OF DISUNITY

Latin America's actions in the United Nations, relations with the European Common Market, and organization of the Latin America Free Trade Area (L.A.F.T.A.) resemble her behavior in hemispheric relations. There has been a consistent pattern of disunity.

As William G. Cornelius recently pointed out, the Latin American countries have not consistently supported the United States in the United Nations. Nor have they formed a coherent bloc of their own, even to elect officials.<sup>22</sup> Latin American representatives in

(Continued on page 115)

<sup>20</sup> Eugene (Oregon) Register-Guard, October 6, 1962; New York Times, October 18, 1962.

<sup>21</sup> The Kennedy administration gave the O.A.S. no credit, but Ambassador Adlai Stevenson spoke of the important role of the United Nations in resolving the crisis. "Ambassador Stevenson Reports," ABC Radio Network, November 11, 1962.

<sup>22</sup> For a general treatment, see Houston, John A., *Latin America in the United Nations*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York, 1956. Latin Americans have had a deep interest in international organizations and have long been active in them.

Paul S. Holbo teaches Latin American history and is acting chairman of the Committee on Latin American Studies. He is the author of several articles and a monograph, "Latin America: Problems and Progress."

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*In a discussion of relations between the nations of Latin America and the Soviet bloc, this specialist concludes that "only Cuba has moved over to the Communist camp. However there is little doubt that the desire for greater independence on the part of many of the Latin American countries has led to a relaxing of the bonds which have tied these nations to the United States. . . ."*

# Latin America and the Communist Bloc

By ROBERT J. ALEXANDER

*Professor of Economics, Rutgers University*

THE CRISIS over Soviet missile bases in Cuba highlights the problem of the relations between the Latin American countries and the nations under Communist control. These relations have been closer in recent years. However, their cordiality should not be exaggerated.

An analysis of Latin American-Soviet relations must be dealt with on two levels. In the first place, it is necessary to look at the problem of government-to-government relations, that is, contacts on the official, diplomatic, economic levels. Second, there is the question of relations on what may be called the party-to-party level, the influence in Latin America of political parties which are under the control of or allied with the parties which rule the Communist nations. Although there is some connection between these two factors, particularly in the case of Cuba, they are not always intimately associated.

The problem of the relations between the governments of Latin America and those of the Communist nations, further, must be discussed under several headings. There is the issue of diplomatic relations, the presence in Latin American countries of embassies, legations, consulates and other official representations of the various Communist countries. Also important is the question of economic relations, which is in many ways more crucial.

Finally, the question of the general align-

ment of the Latin American countries in world affairs looms large. This alignment is particularly highlighted in the case of Castro's Cuba; it is also important in one or two other countries. Latin America's position is likely to become more significant in the future, as the larger and more important of the Latin American countries seek to exert independent weight in global politics as well as in the American Hemisphere.

## DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

The extent of diplomatic relations between the Communist countries and the Latin American nations has varied considerably. During the 1920's, several Latin American countries established relations with the Soviet Union. Subsequently, for one reason or another, these relations were suspended. During World War II, in large part due to pressure from the United States, a considerable number of Latin American countries recognized the Soviet Union and exchanged diplomatic missions with that country. These included Mexico, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Colombia, Venezuela, Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina and Chile.

As the cold war developed, most Latin American nations which had recognized the Soviet Union cancelled diplomatic relations. These nations were Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Colombia, Venezuela, Brazil, Uru-

guay and Chile. As a result, before the advent to power of Castro in Cuba, the only nations in Latin America that still had Soviet diplomatic representatives in their capitals were Mexico and Argentina. As this article is written, these two have been joined by Brazil, Cuba and Uruguay. In the middle of 1962, the Soviet Union also established an unofficial commercial agency in Chile.

In a number of countries in which there are no diplomatic missions of the Soviet Union, the job of representing the Communist bloc is borne by diplomats from the East European nations. The functions of such East European diplomatic missions are varied. They represent the formal interests of their own governments. In addition they seek to encourage the nations to which they are accredited to establish diplomatic relations with other East European governments and in particular with the Soviet Union. They carry on extensive propaganda for all the Communist nations and seek to encourage "political tourism" between the specific Latin American country and the Communist bloc.

### RELATIONS WITH CHINA

Official relations between Communist China and the Latin American nations are confined to Fidel Castro's Cuba. Brazilian President Janio Quadros, during his short seven month administration in 1961, directed that there be a "restudy" of relations with Nationalist China as an apparent prelude to shifting recognition to the Communist regime; yet this shift has not in fact taken place. No other Latin American nation has seriously considered recognizing Red China.

In 1962, an official Peking trade mission visited Brazil and other countries of the area. The Hsinhua News Agency of the Peking government has established offices in Havana, Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires. The writer knows of at least one newspaper in Colombia which uses its services regularly, and there are undoubtedly various others which do so.

In spite of the fact that there is as yet very little official contact between Communist China and the countries of Latin America,

the pace of unofficial contact between the two areas has been rising sharply in recent years. In 1956, the Chinese began organizing "friendship societies" in various countries, the general supervision of which is in the hands of the Chinese-Latin American Friendship Association in Peking. During the last decade or more, thousands of prominent people in the intellectual, political and trade union life of the various Latin American nations have been taken on conducted political tours of Red China. The increasing pace of this tourism is indicated by the fact that the number of such delegations increased from 37 in 1958 to 168 in 1960.

Similarly, numerous delegations of political, intellectual and trade union people from China have visited many of the Latin American nations. One of the most popular of these groups has been the Peking Opera, which has been widely heralded for its artistic merit. Other Chinese visitors have included trade union delegations, a company of tumblers, and leading literary and artistic figures.

Since 1959 an important aspect of Latin American relations with the Communist bloc has been Cuba. Once the Castro government took a decidedly Communist direction, the Cuban diplomatic missions in other Latin American countries functioned as important links in the general chain of Communist bloc contact with these nations. The Cuban diplomats not only preached aggressively the virtues of their own country's regime, but also pushed propaganda for other Communist nations as well. They acted as distributive agencies for publications from all the Communist regimes. They also meddled extensively in the internal politics of the countries to which they were accredited.

The upshot of this kind of activity has been that most Latin American governments have broken off diplomatic relations with Castro's Cuba since 1960. Frequently they acted because of incidents in which Cuban diplomats were seeking to subvert the very governments to which they were assigned. Thus, Peru broke off relations early in 1961 when documents were discovered that indicated that the Cuban Embassy had been subsidizing the



Peruvian Communist party and other extreme left-wing groups. Similar evidence given by a defecting member of the Cuban Embassy in Buenos Aires contributed to the breaking of relations between Argentina and the Castro regime.

### **ECONOMIC RELATIONS**

As in other parts of the world, in Latin America the Communist countries use trade for political purposes. It is therefore of considerable importance to note the extent of commercial relations between the Communist countries and Latin America.

From their point of view, the Latin American nations have good reason to try to expand their trade relations with the Communist countries. Virtually all the 20 Latin American republics depend for the great majority of their foreign trade on one or two mineral or agricultural products. They also find their commerce tied closely to a single country. Until 1960 almost all of them did the great bulk of their trading with the United States, and most of the balance with the nations of Western Europe.

All the Latin American countries are anxious to diversify their trading patterns, both with regard to products which they export and countries with which they carry on their commerce. They have sought to gain new customers in Europe, have sought entry into the booming Japanese market, and naturally have been receptive to possibilities for selling goods to the countries under Communist domination.

Another factor contributes to Latin American willingness to try to do business with the Communists. This is the desire for more rapid economic development. All the countries have ambitious programs for diversifying their economies, and particularly for industrialization. They need outside help for these efforts in the form of capital goods and financial aid. Until 1959, the Latin American countries had not tapped the Soviet and East European sources of economic aid.

Cuba, of course, is the principal Latin American country which has sought and received Communist economic aid. Com-

mencing early in 1960, Cuba began to negotiate trade treaties with all the Communist-controlled nations. Most of these countries also agreed to aid the island's economic development program.

The result has been that there has been a complete shift in the direction of Cuban foreign economic relations. Whereas about two-thirds of Cuban trade was with the United States and most of its foreign investment came from the same source, by 1962, between 80 and 85 per cent of the island's trade was with the countries of the Soviet area. Virtually all its foreign investment was coming from that source.

Since Cuban-Soviet trade was largely politically motivated, Cuban trade relations with most of the Communist countries have involved a virtual subsidy to the Cuban economy. Cuba has tended to receive more from the Communist countries than it sent to them. The great exception to this has been China. Cuba exported some \$85 million worth of goods in the first eight months of 1962 to China and received only \$45 million in return.

However, in spite of having an "unfavorable balance of trade" with most Communist countries, Cuba has not profited to the degree that Castro and his associates had hoped. The Soviet Union, the East European nations and China have taken virtually all the Cuban sugar crop. They have also taken oranges, other citrus fruits and other products of minor importance produced in the island.

The effect of Communist-Cuban trade relations is indicated in one small but significant incident which occurred early in 1962. An issue of the Soviet publication, *U.S.S.R.*, was suppressed in Cuba because it showed a group of smiling children at a dock in the Soviet Union where a shipload of Cuban oranges was being unloaded. Oranges were no longer available in Cuba.

Furthermore, there is considerable reason to believe that the Communist countries are a long way from fulfilling the promises which they made in 1960 and 1961 to aid the industrialization of Cuba. Likewise, they have not been able to provide replacement parts

for the manufactured industrial machinery from the United States with which Cuba was equipped before 1960. As a result, an appreciable proportion of the factories operating before Castro came to power were no longer functioning by 1962, and others had cut down significantly on their output. This created a growing shortage of consumers' goods such as textiles and shoes.

Aside from Cuba, there has been little spectacular increase in Latin American trade with the Communist countries since 1959. Before that period, trade with this area constituted about 2 per cent of Latin America's total commerce. It does not amount to appreciably more than that at the present time.

Brazil is the only other Latin American country which has significantly increased its trade with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe since 1959. Janio Quadros negotiated a commercial treaty with the U.S.S.R. which provided for a considerable increase in trade and likewise made provision for some aid by the Soviet Union to Brazilian industrialization.

The U.S.S.R. has particularly sought to increase its economic relations with Bolivia. It offered to establish a tin refinery in Bolivia, as well as to purchase some of the nation's tin output. However, President Victor Paz Estenssoro has procrastinated on this offer; privately he has said that he has no wish to have a swarm of Russian "technicians" in his country.

## **WORLD ALIGNMENT**

Only Cuba has definitely taken its stand with the Communist nations on world politics. In doing so, it has broken what had previously been a virtually solid bloc of the Latin American nations behind the United States in its struggle with the Soviet Union and its satellites and allies.

However, the first acts of defiance of the Castro regime against the United States met widespread sympathy in the other Latin American countries. There exists a general desire in these nations to develop a more independent foreign policy, less influenced by the wishes of the United States.

Three countries in particular have taken this position: Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. In the first case, there has been a traditional tendency on the part of the Argentines to consider themselves the natural leaders of South America, and therefore the opponents of the extension of United States influence south of the border. However, this feeling has not led the Argentines to side with the Communists in international affairs, or even to adopt a generally neutralist position.

Brazil, in contrast, has for half a century been the Latin American nation most closely associated with the United States in hemisphere affairs. However, in recent years the economic development of the country and its accomplishments in various cultural fields have stimulated a new feeling of self-confidence. As a result, the Brazilians have tended to have a more independent foreign policy, less linked with that of the United States. Under Presidents Janio Quadros and João Goulart there has been a tendency to assume a semi-neutralist position in world affairs, and to develop closer political and economic relations with the Communist nations. Diplomatic relations have been established with the U.S.S.R. and with most of the East European countries.

Mexico, too, has sought to develop a foreign policy independent of the United States. Although it has not adopted "neutralism" as a guide, it has tended to make its own decisions about issues of world and hemispheric policy. It has consistently maintained diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union since the late 1930's.

Other countries have also sought a greater degree of diplomatic independence, without changing their support of the West in world affairs. This has been the situation of Venezuela since President Romulo Betancourt came into office in February, 1959.

Thus, only Cuba has moved over to the Communist camp. However, there is little doubt that the desire for greater independence on the part of many of the Latin American countries has led to a relaxing of the bonds which have tied these nations to the United States, and makes some of them anxious to

have their own diplomatic and other relations with the countries of the Communist camp.

### PARTY-TO-PARTY

Unlike Latin America's relations with other parts of the world, those with the Communist countries involve the presence in the countries of the area of political parties which owe loyalty to the Soviet Union or to Communist China. There have existed Communist parties in at least some of the Latin American nations since the establishment of the Communist International in 1919. Such parties now exist in each of the Latin American countries.

The Communist parties of Latin America have since their inception been characterized by subservience to the Soviet Union. Their principal leaders have been trained in the U.S.S.R. since the 1920's. They received orders from the Soviet Union and have changed their political positions obediently to conform to the changing policies of the U.S.S.R. When the Cominform was established in 1947, three Latin American Communist parties, Argentina, Brazil and Cuba, had representatives there, working directly under the Russians who controlled the Communist Information Bureau. Subsequent to the abolition of the Cominform in April, 1956, the international Communist headquarters were shifted from Bucharest to Prague, where permanent representatives of several Latin American parties were also stationed.

Since the advent of the Castro regime, there has appeared on the Latin American political scene a new element in the Communist periphery. This is what we may call the Jacobin Left. It developed slowly during the decade before Castro came to power, as a result of growing desperation about the possibility for long overdue social reform and rapid economic development. With the appearance of the Castro regime, the Jacobin Left tended to look upon Fidel as its natural leader.

The Jacobin Left finds most of its support among students and young professional peo-

ple. Its members, like their counterparts in revolutionary France, favor social revolution at virtually any cost, are xenophobic nationalists, and have a disparaging if not completely hostile attitude towards political democracy.

Since 1959, the Jacobin Left, which generally regards itself as "Marxist-Leninist" as the Communists, has generally worked in alliance with the old-line Communist parties. This has been most clearly shown in Cuba itself, where the Jacobin Left, the Fidelistas of the 26th of July Movement, have actually merged with the old-time Communist party during the last year and a half.

However, there is good reason to believe that in the future very serious divergences may emerge between the Communists and the Jacobin Left. This possibility was highlighted during the recent crisis over the presence of Soviet missile bases in Cuba. The former secretary general of the Cuban Communist party, Blas Roca, immediately supported Premier Khrushchev's decision to withdraw the missiles, a position which was certainly not shared by Fidel Castro and his immediate associates of the old 26th of July Movement. Blas Roca's lead was followed by Communist party leaders in the other Latin American countries. In contrast, Jacobin Left leaders in various Latin American nations have expressed opposition to the Khrushchev decision.

It seems likely that the difference between the old-line Communists and the Jacobins will increase rather than decrease in the years ahead. Furthermore, it seems likely that when and if the difficulties between the Soviet and Chinese Communist parties become more open, Communist parties around the world will have to take a position with one or the

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*In a review of the accomplishments of the Castro government, this scholar points out that "Cuba is unlikely . . . to become a carbon copy of the U.S.S.R. or one of the satellites unless the 'old [anti-Castro] Communists' gain supremacy. And even they might well believe that a totalitarian state cast somewhat more in a nationalist Cuban mold would best serve their objectives."*

## The Future of Castroism

By DAVID BURKS

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THE MISSILE crisis of October–November, 1962, added a new dimension to the Cuban story. The Russian "presence" in Cuba had been apparent since early in 1960 but both the United States and the Soviet Union had avoided a direct confrontation over Cuba. Now that confrontation has taken place. The removal of the missiles and other so-called "offensive" weapons was a major United States victory over Russia. As of November, 1962, it was seemingly a limited victory over Fidel Castro; his image in Latin America had been clouded, at least in the short run, and he had lost some of his faith in Nikita Khrushchev. To counterbalance his losses, the Cuban leader may have gained a priceless advantage, a *de facto* if not officially stated United States decision not to invade Cuba.

The Cubans signed their first agreements with the Russians in February, 1960, when Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan visited Havana. The Castro revolution was welcomed by the Russian leaders who saw in it limited but very important benefits for their country. Castro's Cuba was to serve as an example of a "national liberation movement," which would encourage the rest of Latin America to follow an "independent foreign" policy by establishing economic and diplomatic relations with the bloc. At the same time, the Russians recognized that Cuba's

position in the "backyard" of the United States made it extremely vulnerable to United States pressure. They may have believed, in fact, that if they invested too much of their prestige in the Cuban venture, it might prove to be only an easily captured hostage to the United States.

Consistent with this view, the Russians sought to assist and encourage the Castro revolution, without investing too much money in it, and without committing themselves irrevocably to its defense. They supplied military equipment and training, but refrained from signing a defensive alliance, something Castro wanted very much after the summer of 1960. Their early trade and aid agreements offered the Cubans a market for their sugar and a source of supplies, but these treaties were not in any sense give-away programs or subsidies for the Cuban economy. Under their provisions, the Communist bloc received large quantities of raw sugar, but bloc countries were very slow in supplying some of the goods promised in return. The best example of delay is the failure of the bloc to deliver promised equipment for a large number of factories essential to Cuban economic plans.

Cuba was of value to the Russians in another way. It was a convenient base for Communist activities in Latin America, although the Russians did not risk centering



all of their activities in Havana. Castro's own unquenchable desire to export his revolution encouraged the kind of unrest in Latin America that the Communists thought would be useful to them.

The failure of the April 17, 1961, invasion marked the turning point in the Russian position. Khrushchev decided that the United States lacked the national will to crush Castroism. In May, 1962, the Russians began to subsidize the Cuban economy and shortly thereafter they decided to send the missiles to Cuba. Although the 40-odd missiles were primarily intended to redress the global balance of power, their emplacement in Cuba brought an important secondary benefit. They would, so the Russians must have thought, protect Cuba from an attack which Castro believed was coming. The Russians believed that it was not, and therefore concluded that relatively small risk was inherent in this action. At this writing, it is too early to describe the exact effect of the missile crisis on the Khrushchev-Castro relationship, but without a doubt it has been changed.

Nor is it likely that the Castro regime has been left unscarred at home by the Russian retreat. Essentially, however, Castro's strength within Cuba depends less upon his relations with the Communist countries than upon the nature of his revolution. It also depends upon the origins and nature of his conversion to Marxism-Leninism. Can he as a "new Communist" retain his personal hold over the Cuban people and dominate the "old Communist militants"?

## PROFILE OF A REVOLUTION

Much has appeared in the American press about the social and economic reforms of the Castro regime. With few exceptions, emphasis has been placed upon specific programs, many of them stage-managed by the regime in its first months for the greatest possible public relations effect. The conversion of military barracks into schools (some of them now reconverted to house Russian troops), the literacy campaign, the rural health dispensaries, the school building programs, and anti-polio campaigns are a

few of the numerous reforms touted in Cuba and abroad. Little attention has been paid to the long-term impact of these specific programs either singly or as a total revolutionary effort. The basic question is whether or not these programs have changed the basic structure of Cuban society. In other words, is the Castro revolution a social revolution—a term used here not in any sense of either approval or opprobrium? The answer is a qualified yes. Castro has been in power slightly more than four years, long enough to plan and implement programs but not long enough for their full effect to be felt.

The most devastating effect of the revolution has been its elimination of the old upper class and decimation of what was until 1959 one of the largest middle classes in Latin America. The revolution is creating its own class system with a new revolutionary élite, many of whom will hold responsible positions after Castro falls from power. Revolutionary programs are reinforcing the weakened middle class with new recruits drawn from the peasants and workers. A prime objective of the revolution's massive educational drive is the training of peasant and working-class children and even adults for white collar and technical employment in the socialist bureaucracy.

To what extent is Cuba today a state of peasants or workers, representing their interests and attracting their support? Critics and defenders of Castro have disputed at length the supposed peasant origins of his revolution, in part, one imagines, because such roots somehow make a revolution more respectable. The dispute is rather meaningless unless an agreed-upon definition of "peasant revolution" is used. A purely peasant political movement did not exist in pre-Castro Cuba, and the middle and upper class political parties of the 1930's and 1940's had paid small mind to peasant needs.

Castro, on the other hand, did court and win the support of many Oriente peasants, one of the most depressed groups in rural Cuba. A majority of his enlisted men were *quajiros*, although his officers were probably drawn more from the lower middle class

than from any other sector. The propaganda program carried on among the peasants by the Castro forces was semi-Marxist in its emphasis upon class conflict but conventional in its promise of land reform. The degree to which Castro won and has held peasant support in this one province of Cuba is shown by the failure of the anti-Castro opposition to mount a guerrilla movement in the Sierra Maestra. The degree of peasant support for Castro was markedly less in the Escambray and elsewhere. Furthermore, Castro was not able to topple Batista with only the backing of the peasants in Oriente; he needed and finally succeeded in obtaining overwhelming support from the middle and upper classes.

After Castro took over Cuba, his policy was aimed at retaining and enlarging peasant support for his government by improvements in the peasants' economic and social position. For economic and political reasons, the original promise of a smallholder agrarian reform was ignored. The large estates were transformed into cooperatives (collective farms) and state farms, not into the small farms which a majority of the peasants desired. The admitted failure of the sugar cooperatives has forced the government to convert them into state farms. And recently the regime has made known its intention to incorporate remaining private farms in cooperatives. The peasants living on government farms apparently feel that they were deceived by the revolution.

To counteract this feeling, Castro has explained countless times why private farming is not workable in Cuba and cannot compete with state-run entities. He has also stressed that the peasants must work harder to pay for the consumer goods and other benefits that they have been receiving from the urban worker. For these reasons the revolution cannot now be said to represent the desires of a majority of the peasants despite the immediate and direct material benefits they may have received earlier in the revolution.

This loss of peasant support has forced the regime to identify and reward those peasants

who are still loyal or are more productive workers. This is being done by means of the system of "socialist emulation," the defense committees, and the militia. Loyal peasants have been promoted to managerial positions in agriculture but they do not play an important part in decision-making. Most of the policies are set by people with middle-class background, "Old Communist" militants, pre-revolutionary bureaucrats who have remained in office, or members of the 26th of July group.

The status of the Cuban worker before the revolution was high as measured by such indices as union membership and wages. Because organized labor had been able to obtain an advantageous position in Cuban life, it was generally not in favor of Castro before 1959. The political position of the unorganized workers is unknown, although some of them fought with Castro and non-Castro guerrilla forces. After Batista fell, the labor leaders who were allied with him were replaced by 26th of July men and these, in turn, were replaced by pro-Communists and Communists. After 1959, union members experienced a deterioration in their level of living and saw their unions lose importance as a vehicle for achieving labor's desires and voicing its grievances. Some workers, however, remembered the days before 1947 when the Communists ran the Confederation of Cuban Workers and seemed to adjust quite easily to the changes. Others have enjoyed promotion to straw-boss and managerial positions. Although it is the official line that Cuba is governed by a workers-peasants alliance, one can say with certainty that many workers, like many peasants, are dissatisfied with the present system which they neither run nor ultimately control.

However, one sector of Cuban society is very much in favor of the revolution; it is the younger generation, almost regardless of social origin. Castro has said that individuals over 35 cannot be expected fully to understand and, by implication, fully to cooperate with the revolution. The government is heavily staffed by young Cubans and much of the revolution's verve comes from them.

## THE ROOTS OF CASTRO'S COMMUNISM

Cuba was in a fortunate position in the years after the fall of Machado in 1933, at least in comparison with most of Latin America. Progress was made toward political maturity and democracy; the sugar industry experienced boom as well as depressed years; and gradually the United States came to exercise less control over Cuban life. The crucial failure of the post-Machado era was the inability of the Cubans to develop a genuine revolutionary tradition which could mobilize majority support for necessary programs and produce leadership rising above mere personalism to stand on principle. Only if the Cubans had achieved a consensus on the rate and direction of change could they have used their many advantages to reach laudable goals of political maturity, diversified economic growth, and greater social justice.

Elements of a revolutionary tradition had persisted from 1898 but always in the intellectual and moral shadow of the United States. A new tradition began to emerge in the 1930's, chiefly under the leadership of the *Auténticos*, a middle-class party advocating a wide range of reforms. Denied their turn in office until 1944 by Batista, the army, and the United States, their frustrated reformist zeal eventually gave way to a limitless hunger for the rewards of power. In office until 1952, the leaders of this party failed to diversify the economy, redistribute wealth, engage in agrarian reform or otherwise implement their program. In some fields retrogression took place; education steadily declined; and reliance upon political gangsters was institutionalized.

If idealism had died elsewhere by the 1940's and 1950's, it was still alive at the universities. This generation of students, however, offered little hope because they were, as former Minister of Education Sánchez Arango has called them, "a lost generation." They received almost no training in intellectual discipline or rational thought and blended their idealism with corruption and violence. The atmosphere at the universities was leftist and nationalist. Marxism, as distinct from the party which espoused it, was

regarded as a coherent, systematic, respectable doctrine of social change; it appealed strongly to the students and their intellectual mentors. Many students absorbed a smattering of Marxist ideas to the point where they became Marxists in a loose way, although they did not usually seek admission to the Communist party. The party was viewed as another radical faction with which it was possible to do political business. A kind of pointless drifting in and out of the party or of organizations on the fringe of the party was a common practice, so much so that some of the staunchest supporters of Batista and some of his strongest opponents had done so in their younger days.

Fidel and Raúl Castro were products of the university life of this period. Fidel was an opportunist and was addicted to violence, but he failed to achieve noteworthy success as a student leader. Raúl's behavior was more subdued. Both had friendly as well as competitive relations with the Communists; Raúl belong to the Communist youth group and visited the bloc, while Fidel had some unclear connection with front activities. Castro has admitted that he did some reading in Communist books (he reached page 373 of *Das Kapital*) and picked up a few Marxist ideas.

Castro's relations with the Communists were unfriendly in the early 1950's because the Popular Socialist (Communist) party (P.S.P.) was not only able to survive under Batista, but, indeed, opposed Castro's method of seeking to overthrow the dictator. Unfriendliness was replaced by friendly tolerance, as both he and the leaders of the P.S.P. found it convenient to draw closer in 1958. His experiences with the peasants in the mountains and his trouble with the middle-class exiles moved Castro to the left. The P.S.P. leaders, for their part, hid their suspicions of the "bourgeois putchist" when they became convinced that Castro would win in a surge of popular support. The allegations of a P.S.P.-Castro deal before January 1, 1959, are not borne out by available evidence. Apparently the P.S.P., after failing to negotiate as an equal, offered its support in return

for the hope of legality and permission to reopen mass media, a promise Castro made to the other opposition groups.

Castro's recent description of himself and his two close advisers as men who were trying in 1959 to make a socialist revolution without socialists is most apt. He could not stomach the idea of a return to the pre-Batista era of barter politics (*politiquería*), in which his image would be dimmed and his supremacy ended. He held up elections and permitted only the P.S.P. to operate with complete freedom because it came closest to advocating the kind of program he favored. The leaders of the P.S.P., and particularly Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, played up to his megalomania, his lust for power, and his penchant for seeing himself as the living embodiment of the revolution. The Communists not only gave him unquestioning support but were willing and able to bring their trained cadres to bear on the chaos which had resulted from the overly-rapid implementation of his reforms. At the same time Castro was gradually alienated from his moderate supporters who consistently called for a slowing down of his efforts to turn society inside out and who regarded with fear his deification as a leader.

The turning point was the C.T.C. (Confederation of Cuban Workers) congress in November, 1959, when Castro for the first time took steps to save the P.S.P. from defeat. By late 1960, Castro depended almost completely on the Communists to carry out the necessary task of organizing the government and of suppressing opposition because the rebel army, his other major element of support, had become infected with unrest.

In his famous speech of December 2-3, 1961, Fidel Castro announced that he was and always would be a Communist. His conversion to communism gave his revolution a guiding philosophy which supplied rational and moral purpose. The failure of Castro and his early advisers to formulate a purely Cuban philosophy of revolution was the result not so much of their own inadequacies as of the bankruptcy of the Cuban revolutionary tradition. Castro was undoubtedly sincere in open admissions in December, 1961, of in-

feriority in the face of communism's venerable traditions and knowledgeable cadres. It must also be reassuring for him to be able to look back as he does, and interpret his earlier ideological bewilderment as an historically inevitable phase of development.

Putting theory into practice, the seizure of factories and businesses in October, 1960, marked the actual beginning of the socialist stage of the revolution which Fidel proclaimed the following May 1. Soon afterward, the public became aware of discussion in government circles of the need for a single party. This two-stage process was to take place on the basis of terms announced by Castro on December 2, 1961: first, the 26th of July movement, representing primarily the peasant elements in Cuban society, the Revolutionary Directorate (the students) and the P.S.P. (the workers) were to merge. The petty bourgeoisie and intellectuals were represented jointly by the first two. There would be, Castro said, no discrimination by the "old Communists" against the "new" and vice versa. Later, a socialist party with a smaller membership would appear.

Anibal Escalante, perhaps seeking to emulate Stalin, but more likely following party orders, staffed the first-stage Integrated Revolutionary Organizations (O.R.I.) by simply transferring P.S.P. cell leaders to the positions of power in the new organization. The 26th of July officers could not be used, according to Escalante, because they were politically incompetent and unreliable. The O.R.I. soon interfered with the day-to-day operation of the ministers to such a degree that the normal processes of government were fettered by red tape and a divided command. Escalante's policy, if successful, would have made Castro a figurehead and would have led to the downgrading of Raúl Castro and of Guevara.

The Castro speech of March 26, 1962, was the official announcement of the restoration of his own control as opposed to "collective leadership." Castro finally realized that the reins of power were slipping from him. He was embittered by the open Communist criti-



cism of his past leadership (the 26th of July, 1953, attack on the Moncada barracks was a mistake, they said). He may also have faced organized pressure from the military, perhaps even a threatened revolt, for he referred in his speech to an earlier meeting with 100 former rebel officers who had been deprived of command because of their "low political level." Escalante was purged and the O.R.I. was reorganized. The old Communists acquiesced in Castro's actions because he still had in his hands the essential control of the masses, which was more important than all the repressive apparatus of the police state. The Communists were not yet ready for a direct battle with Castro.

### THE FUTURE OF CASTRO

Many of the characteristics of the Castro dictatorship in Cuba are familiar to the student of Latin American affairs; but these will diminish in number and importance as the Communist ideology is brought to bear on every aspect of life. Cuba is unlikely, however, to become a carbon copy of the U.S.S.R. or one of the satellites unless the "old Communists" gain supremacy. And even they might well believe that a totalitarian state cast somewhat more in a nationalist Cuban mold would best serve their objectives.

Any assessment of popular support for the regime raises almost more questions than it answers. Only by free elections or by scientific polling, both impossible, could one arrive at an accurate evaluation of Cuban public opinion. The Cubans have lived under dictators before but never under one commanding such effective instruments of repression or offering, at least at first, such broadly distributed economic benefits. The Castro police are very un-Cuban in their efficiency and are backed by a frightening system of summary justice and capital punishment.

The regime does not try to stifle all criticism, preferring to channel part of it through the carefully censored system of public self-criticism. This public criticism is not of the system *per se* but rather of mistakes made by officials running the system. The ordinary

citizen participates in the system both by condemning the inadequacies of officials and confessing that his own "revolutionary conscience" is imperfect. Repression forces those opposed to the government to resort to passive means of resistance—absenting themselves from work or applauding an American movie in a darkened theater. Active resistance still exists on a small scale in both city and countryside but is always precarious and furtive. Rank and file organized labor is surely unhappy and the small farmer is disaffected. But most Cubans are so busy getting food and other supplies that they have no time or energy to plot against the government.

Castro undoubtedly has strong support from certain well-defined groups: numerous students and young people, the professional army which now includes a hard core of devoted militiamen, the Communists, and a varied assortment of middle class revolutionaries and others who have tied their futures to the revolution.

Aside from these cadres, one key to the popularity of Castroism is its success or failure in the economic field. With the exception of those Cubans who belong to the poverty-stricken part of the lower class, the population is experiencing a declining standard of living. As this has happened, official propaganda has become even more blatant in predicting in specific terms the good things of life each Cuban will enjoy in the future. While admitting that mismanagement is responsible for many of the problems, the tendency is to lean upon the "imperialist blockade" as an excuse. Economic catastrophe is unlikely to topple the government and may give it instead the opportunity to continue the destruction of its enemies by starvation. Also, the regime has in part counterbalanced the growing shortages of food by offering other

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David Burks is presently on leave to serve as a Research Fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations, under whose auspices he is writing a book about the impact of Castroism on Latin America.

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*The Argentine government crisis followed the Peronist electoral victory of March, 1962. This specialist analyzes the subsequent military dictatorship and the compromise solution worked out by the liberal group within the military. "This solution . . . has apparently been received by the majority of Argentines with relief. . . . They feel that although it is by no means perfect . . . it seems a workable compromise generally acceptable to all but extremists."*

## Left and Right Extremism in Argentina

By ARTHUR P. WHITAKER

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FRIENDS OF progressive democracy everywhere have been bitterly disappointed by Argentina's dismal public performance in 1962. At the beginning of the year, Argentina gave promise of recovery after three decades of assorted crises. There were even some who hopefully regarded it as the best showcase for the Alliance for Progress. From March to September, however, the country was wracked by military and political upheavals which, some of its people say, have set it back 20 years.

Although those who gained control in the culminating September, 1962, crisis have begun to pick up the pieces, with the laudable intent of restoring constitutional government in 1963, they face long-standing problems that have been greatly aggravated by the new crisis. These include an inflation that has now begun to gallop, a large-scale flight of capital, a slowing down of the whole economy, virtual bankruptcy, and the deep-seated social and political tensions that brought on the March-September series of upheavals. In addition, the peace that has been restored is unstable; one of the most prominent Argentine leaders has described the present regime as anomalous, on the ground that it is obviously unconstitutional and yet too weak to be classified as *de facto*.

Disappointment is all the keener because,

among Latin Americans, the Argentines are an exceptionally fortunate, well-endowed people. They stand at or near the top in literacy, per capita income, and economic diversification. Indeed, they have already reached a stage of development which most of the rest of Latin America cannot hope to achieve in less than 10 or 20 years even if the Alliance for Progress succeeds to perfection. Furthermore, the Argentines are a homogeneous people in the sense that they are overwhelmingly of Spanish and Italian origin. Finally, they are exempt from one of the handicaps suffered by most Latin American peoples, namely the population explosion. Argentina's annual rate of increase is just under 2 per cent, as compared with rates of from 2.5 to 4 per cent elsewhere in Latin America. Its present population of 20 million, with a density of 20 persons per square mile, has ample room for increase because of a national territory rich in natural resources and lying very largely in the temperate zone.

On the other hand, Argentina exhibits in a high degree one of the other phenomena common to most of Latin America (and to many other parts of the world): the revolution of rising aspirations. Add to this a contrary force, the positive political role that Argentina's armed forces have played with increasing vigor since 1930, and the major basic

reasons for the protracted crisis of March–September, 1962, become clear.

### RESURGENT PERONISM

The main bone of contention in the crisis was Peronism. By 1962, nearly seven years had passed since the overthrow (September 18, 1955) of President Juan Perón's quasi-totalitarian regime. Perón had been in exile all this time (most recently in Madrid) and had found a replacement for his first wife and workers' idol, Eva Duarte (died 1952). Yet he still retained the loyalty of a large minority of the Argentine people.

His hold was particularly strong over the workers, the *descamisados* ("shirtless ones"), whom he had organized and regimented in labor unions and made one of the two pillars of his regime. To them he was still the man who 'first gave them organization, political power, *dignidad*, and other more tangible benefits. About two-thirds of the members of Argentina's big labor confederation, the C.G.T., were still Peronists in 1962. They were loyal to Perón partly as a symbol, partly as a source of funds (he had apparently banked large sums abroad before his fall), but also because they regarded all the governments that followed his as reactionary and determined to deprive them of the gains they had made under his aegis.

There was ground for this apprehension during the provisional government under a military junta presided over by General Pedro Aramburu (1955–1958), which sought not only to purge the government, the armed forces, and organized labor of Peronists but to root out Peronism. There was also ground for it in the considerable extent to which the armed forces influenced the restored constitutional government headed by President Arturo Frondizi. Frondizi was inaugurated on May 1, 1958, for what was to have been a six-year term. This dichotomy of armed forces versus Peronists is a curious one, for, until 1955, the armed forces had been the other main pillar of Perón's regime. In that year, however, most of them turned against him; and ever since they have seemingly done penance for having once been loyal to him by

attacking those who still are. Actually, the dichotomy rests on a genuine antagonism, which can be briefly described as one between left wing (proletarian Peronism) and center-right wing (armed forces). The two were locked in open conflict as early as 1945, and it was no small achievement for Perón to have harnessed both of them to his chariot and made them work in tandem until the close of his nine years as president.

When Arturo Frondizi became president on May 1, 1958, it looked as if he might succeed in duplicating Perón's feat. Peronist votes had assured his election and the dominant armed forces group, headed by General Aramburu, now assured his inauguration in the face of dire threats from the extreme anti-Peronists among the military, the so-called "gorillas." From that time until his overthrow nearly four years later Frondizi's effort to keep the peace between these two groups and retain the support of both was continued with unflagging vigor but diminishing success up to the moment of his final catastrophe in March, 1962.

Why Frondizi failed so ignominiously is a puzzle that specialists will probably argue about for a long time to come. At the outset the odds in favor of his success seemed to be heavy. He began with great prestige and power as the undisputed leader of a party that had won a smashing victory in the 1958 election. His party controlled both houses of Congress by overwhelming majorities. While the economic, political, and moral wreckage left by the Perón regime presented him with formidable problems, they were by no means insuperable. Argentina is basically a rich country; there was widespread enthusiasm over the prospect of a return to free, democratic government; General Aramburu's Provisional Government had already brought the country through the first and most trying years of the post-Perón period.

The reasons for his failure cannot be explored in detail here, but certain considerations need to be noted because of their bearing on his fall and on the near-chaos that ensued. First, Frondizi's failure reflects in part the failure of Argentina's big middle

class (40 per cent of the total population) to fill the power vacuum created by the old oligarchy's loss of political control. The middle class is almost equally divided politically between the two mutually hostile branches into which the once united Radical party has split: Frondizi's own Intransigent Radicals, and the People's Radicals led by his quondam party chief, Ricardo Balbín. United, these two could control the country. In the March, 1962, election their combined vote was just over 50 per cent of the total, as compared with 35 per cent for the next largest group, the Peronists.

The Radicals' split enabled the Peronist minority to win. This victory triggered the March–September crisis, which brought the country to the verge of civil war and chaos. Yet through it all the two Radical factions kept up their private fight. They and the middle class which they represent have a heavy responsibility for their country's calamitous situation.

#### FRONDIZI FALLS

In the second place, Frondizi cannot be absolved of all responsibility. To begin with, it was he who provoked the Radical schism (through personal ambition, some say; for high policy reasons, according to others) and he has done nothing important to heal it, not even in the near-chaos that followed his fall. Moreover, during his administration of nearly four years he followed a course which aggravated social and political tensions, fatally weakened his own political position (elected by a two-thirds majority in 1958, by 1960 he had lost the support of all but his Intransigent Radicals, representing one-fourth of the voters), made a new record for corruption, and seriously discredited the democratic system of government.

Some of his measures were sound and even noble, but the best of them were frustrated by his other actions, which some attribute to petty politics and others to sheer bad judgment. Thus, after six months in office he adopted an ambitious plan for financial stabilization and economic development. The plan was endorsed by leading economists, but

was bitterly denounced by Peronist and other workers as a betrayal of the demagogic campaign promises by which he had won their votes in the election early that year. Nothing did more than this plan to reduce him to the status of a minority president or to aggravate the social and political tensions that found expression in sabotage, bombings, and other acts of violence.

Another example is Frondizi's treatment of the Peronists. He sought to reincorporate them into the normal life of the nation, and this seemed statesmanlike. He turned the C.G.T. back to the workers early in 1961 on terms that assured Peronist labor leaders of controlling two-thirds of the union membership. His critics were sure he had taken this step for political reasons, in the hope that, through coalition, alliance, or absorption, Peronist voters would combine with his Intransigent Radicals to restore him and his party to a majority position.

Frondizi's crowning blunder was his legalization of Peronist party participation in the election of March 18, 1962. Previously, the Peronists could only vote. Now, for the first time in a national election since 1955, they were permitted to organize and present their own candidates and platforms. Frondizi's action in this case has been explained on various grounds: a desire to restore political normality by bringing the Peronist masses "back into the union (like the Confederate states after the American Civil War and Reconstruction); the mistaken belief that the Peronists had no chance to win, so that he would risk nothing of consequence by being generous to them; and the Machiavellian calculation that he stood to gain whether they won or lost the election (since if they lost it they would be discredited and crippled, whereas if they won it he could ingratiate himself with the anti-Peronists by yielding to the probable demand of the armed forces for an intervention to cancel the election results).

Whatever the explanation, Frondizi's action was obviously based on a gross misjudgment of the situation. The Peronists, though a minority, outvoted each of the Radical parties by a wide margin, won control of ten prov-

inces (including the largest, Buenos Aires), and gained 44 seats in the Chamber of Deputies (the lower house of Congress), where they had had none before. As expected, the armed forces promptly insisted on intervening to nullify the Peronist victory. As forecast by some, Frondizi yielded to the extent of decreeing military intervention in the five provinces (again including the Province of Buenos Aires) which the Peronists had won without help from other parties.

Frondizi's surrender to the military on this issue greatly weakened his moral and legal position. It did not, as some had forecast, appease the armed forces. On the contrary, the latter first demanded that Frondizi give up much of his power by forming a coalition government; then, when that proved impossible because of the unwillingness of the People's Radicals and other parties to bail Frondizi out by joining the coalition, the armed forces ousted him (March 29).

Refusing to resign, Frondizi was flown to the island of Martín García in the Plata River, where many political prisoners have been detained. He has been confined there ever since, though visitors have limited access to him. Report has it that he could have his freedom on condition that he leave the country, but that he has rejected this condition. He claims that he is still president, and his claim seems technically valid since he has neither resigned, nor been removed by impeachment, nor has he left the country without the consent of Congress. These are the only constitutional modes of vacating the office.

## **MILITARY RULE**

Since Frondizi's removal, Argentina has been governed by what amounts to a military dictatorship behind a transparent civilian façade. Through the protracted crisis that lasted until September, this façade was provided mainly by the acting president, José María Guido. Guido, as Speaker of the Senate, was next in the line of succession after Frondizi since the office of vice-president was vacant. As a result of the resolution of the crisis in September, the civilian component

was strengthened, mainly by the emergence of Julio Alsogaray, former Minister of Economy under Frondizi, as a major influence in the government.

Yet this still remains essentially a military dictatorship. Alsogaray owes his influence in large part to the fact that his brother is a general in the army and a leading member of the group that came out on top in the September conflict within the armed forces. Indeed, the presence of any civilian component at all in the post-September government is due to the fact that the winning military faction desired it. If the other faction had won, Argentina might have been governed for several years to come by an exclusively military dictatorship—and by a dictatorship bent upon extirpating Peronism at all costs.

As already noted, the question of what to do about the Peronists was the main bone of contention in the March–September crisis. A proper account of this complex period would fill a book; it must suffice here to say that, given the virtual neutralization of the middle groups, the main trend of the period was towards both left-wing and right-wing extremism. In the brief hour of their March electoral victory, the Peronist leaders had at least talked in moderate terms: affirming their devotion to representative democracy; reassuring supporters of free enterprise; courting the Catholic hierarchy; and even flattering the armed forces. But by July a large bloc of them had come forth with a “battle plan” that sounded very much like Cuban Fidelism except for the absence of a great profession of Marxist-Leninist faith.

At the other extreme, the “gorilla” element in the armed forces grew apace. The relatively moderate and recently dominant General Aramburu was pushed into the background. Another top general, Federico Toranzo Montero, who in 1960 had warned his fellow officers against intervening in political affairs, now took the lead in such intervention. In August, 1962, by a show of force, this element gained what seemed firm control of the government.

Fortunately, the armed forces of Argentina are not a monolithic unit. They are divided



by inter-service rivalries, by rivalries (often of a personal kind) within each service, and by differences in political and social sympathies. Many of them are genuinely devoted to constitutional government under a system of representative democracy, in other words, to the kind of system contemplated by the constitution Argentina has had ever since 1853. In September, this group struck back. After a confused period in which they traded shots and epithets with the "gorillas," the liberal group won.

Thereupon decrees were issued which settled the political problem in these terms: civilian, constitutional government is to be restored at what was regarded as the earliest possible moment, through elections held in March, 1963. The new government will be inaugurated the following October. Peronists will of course be permitted to vote; they will not be permitted to organize parties and present tickets. Report has it that the legally recognized parties are already angling for the Peronist votes through the formation of sub rosa coalitions. Finally, the old Sáenz Peña electoral law has been discarded in favor of a system of proportional representation which will make it impossible for a minority party to win a sweeping victory such as the Peronists did in March, 1962.

This solution of the immediate political problem has apparently been received by the majority of Argentines with relief rather than enthusiasm. They feel that although it is by no means perfect, the outcome of the crisis could easily have been far worse. It seems a workable compromise, generally acceptable to all but extremists. If it works, the civilian population may shake off the apathy that most civilians displayed throughout the long crisis of 1962, which was one of its most striking features.

#### A SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY

This solution cannot work unless the principal power groups have given up the political brinkmanship that brought on that crisis; a special responsibility in this matter rests on the two Radical parties. If it fails, the latter and all the other established political parties, rang-

ing from the new Christian Democrats to the nearly 60-year-old Socialist party, may find themselves bypassed if not wiped out. In that case there would be a number of possible alternative solutions: a traditional military dictatorship, or Nasserism (much discussed recently), or neo-Peronism, or an Argentine version of Castro-Communism or French Gaullism. All these are so unpleasant and basically so un-Argentine that the present odds are that the compromise will work.

The country's already formidable economic problems were aggravated by the crisis in ways suggested above, but they are not insoluble for a country potentially so rich and so well developed as Argentina. Basically, however, they are political rather than economic. As Minister of Economy Alsogaray warned his fellow countrymen at the height of the crisis, they must put their political house in order before they can hope to do the same for their economy. And even when political order is established, many specific economic problems—such as those relating to tax reform, agrarian reform, petroleum production, and foreign investments—will require prior political decisions. Agreement about these will be difficult to achieve for many reasons, but especially because these problems involve both the interests of the entrenched classes in Argentina and the demands of nationalism, which, in diverse forms, is rampant and deeply rooted.

Argentina's changing international role in 1962, including its relations with the United States, illustrates the latter point. Pressure from Peronists and other extreme nationalists explains the Frondizi administration's refusal to support strong measures against Castro's

(Continued on page 116)

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*In a discussion of Mexico's domestic progress and its policy in the cold war, this specialist observes that "An administration that seeks to collaborate with diverse elements, to maintain unity, control and order, to balance social welfare and economic growth, to maintain revolutionary principles at home and abroad and still to face economic realities is bound to appear vacillating and equivocal in its policies."*

## Mexico: Cool Revolution and Cold War

By STANLEY R. ROSS

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### I

HOW LONG is a revolution? Does it end when violent and forceful means are supplanted by legal and evolutionary devices? Or does it continue as long as revolutionary aspirations are but incompletely fulfilled and revolutionary goals incompletely achieved? For Mexican politicians the employment of revolutionary jargon has become traditional and the reaffirmation of revolutionary goals the presumed path to popular support and political success. Some Mexican scholars have suggested that the Revolution as an historical phenomenon is dead and only awaits a decent interment.

Adolfo López Mateos recently reached the two-thirds mark of his six-year presidential term. Two years earlier the nation celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of the hemisphere's first social revolution and one which in many ways anticipated current unrest in the Americas and provided inspiration for reformers in other Latin American nations. The balance sheet of the Mexican Revolution after more than five decades is a mixture of accomplishments and shortcomings. López Mateos has shown himself responsive to the need to provide social justice for more Mexicans, but has

found his task complicated by an ideological division which springs from fundamental differences in regard to internal policies and reflects the international situation created by the Cold War.

The Mexican Revolution which began as a political upheaval against a dictatorship evolved into a full-fledged political, social and economic movement. As its character became defined, it represented an attack on the existing social order, on the dominant agrarian institution (the *hacienda*), on the privileged Church and on the foreign capitalist. It sought to provide the Mexican people with land and liberty and education. It strove to forge a nation of Mexicans directed by Mexicans for Mexicans. Disillusioned with the effectiveness of traditional liberalism, the Mexican revolutionaries framing the Constitution for their movement in 1917 retained the ideals of liberalism while placing the interests of society and of the state above those of the individual. The principal articles of the Constitution of 1917—Articles 3, 27, 123 and 130—greatly enhanced the power of the state while restricting and weakening the targets of the revolution.

While revolutionary governments experi-

mented and revolutionary programs fluctuated in intensity, the dominant note through the Cárdenas regime (1934–1940) was agrarianism. However desirable agrarian reform was from a social, political and psychological point of view, it alone was not satisfying the needs of a growing Mexican population. The incompleteness of their economic independence and the inadequacy of their undeveloped economy were brought home to the Mexicans by the successive shocks of depression and war. World War II was the period of transition as Mexico turned from radicalism to moderation and conservatism, from emphasis on agrarian reform to emphasis on agricultural production, from anticlericalism to moderation, and from rejection to welcoming foreign capital. Industrialization and urbanization became noteworthy characteristics of the Mexican scene as the country embarked on what its leadership described as “institutionalized revolution.”

## II

Skilled observers evaluating the results of the Mexican Revolution have concluded that it is both “matured” and “incomplete.” Dramatic changes have been effected in the political, social and economic life of the nation, but achievements have fallen short of goals, and too many Mexicans share only to a limited extent or not at all in the benefits of the revolutionary program.

Perhaps most noteworthy in a hemisphere where unrest is general and instability traditional is Mexico’s unique achievement of political stability. For more than three decades, Mexico’s political life has been characterized by regularity, with presidents completing their terms and giving way to lawful successors. The strengthening of the state, the support of popular elements, the growth of a middle class, the professionalization of the military under civilian control, the forging of an integrated nation, the firm establishment of the principle of no re-election, and the introduction of the official party as a means of reconciling rival interests and personal ambitions without violence, all have contributed to stabilizing Mexican political life.

“Effective Suffrage and No Re-election” was the battle cry of Madero at the start of the Revolution; this remains the revolutionary political slogan. Most honest commentators will concede that only the latter has been achieved. For 32 years the official party has been consistently triumphant, its candidates succeeding one another in the presidency. It can be argued that opposition parties (National Action on the right and Popular Socialist on the left) are reduced to the status of critics since they do not offer a meaningful alternative to the revolutionary party and cannot take over its role as the interpreter of the Revolution. Similarly, it can be noted that the one-party system has within its structure the elements needed for a democratic, responsive system. However, this democratic nature has remained more latent than active. Politically, the Mexican arrangement has been overwhelmingly a presidential regime with each administration taking on the coloration of the executive. The successful functioning of this system is entirely contingent on the responsiveness, talent and energy of the chief executive.

Socially the simple, sharply pyramidal social structure of the Díaz regime has undergone striking modification. The limited upper class which based its dominant position largely on the monopolization of land has been supplanted by a new upper class whose economic base is finance, industry, and commerce, often associated with political influence. Even more significant, perhaps, has been the growth in numbers and importance of the middle class. Nourished by the urbanization and industrialization of Mexico, as well as by the agrarian, agricultural, labor and educational programs of the Revolution, the growing middle groups are the best evidence of the fluidity of post-revolutionary society.

Mass elements in society have been the beneficiaries of agrarian, social welfare and educational programs as well as of participation, albeit limited, in the fruits of economic development. Since 1915, over 100 million acres of land have been restored or distributed to peasants. Financial assistance, irrigation and scientific agriculture have diversified and

raised productivity while regional programs have brought electrification, sanitation, education and integration with the national economy and society. Industrial labor has been given a protected status with legally defined benefits including juridical recognition of unions, wage and hour regulation, social security and machinery for conciliation and arbitration.

The shortcomings of the social reform are apparent even to the casual observer. The new wealth being created has been most unevenly distributed while the rapidly growing population—increasing at three per cent per year—has limited the per capita advance. Social justice must be provided for more and more Mexicans. In his recent, excellent study of the past two decades of Mexican development, Howard F. Cline found that almost 40 per cent of the Mexican population continued to exist in the transitional (precarious) and popular (lower) strata of society.<sup>1</sup> Despite agrarian reform, substantial amounts of land remain in private hands, some of it in concentrated form. Some of these owners are political beneficiaries of revolutionary regimes, but all have been fortified by recent efforts to bring security to the rural scene and to increase production.

The peasant population finds itself hampered in some instances by the inadequate size of holdings and by the incomplete extension of social advances to rural areas. However, the principal problem is posed by the pressure of growing population on available land. The excess population has the unenviable options of illegal land seizure, migration to the new urban slum areas or enlisting in the legions of *braceros* (migratory workers) contracted for service across the frontier in the United States. Despite legal protections and efforts to control the prices of basic foods and medicines, the urban worker finds himself caught between restricted real wages and a labor movement that is disciplined and politically affiliated with the dominant revolutionary

élite. Both the rural and urban masses have paid the price of a forced economic development.

Imaginative educational programs and considerable expenditure of funds (often the largest single item in the national budget, reaching 21 per cent last year) have reduced illiteracy to one-third of the population, but population growth has made it difficult for the government to keep pace with the problem. Indeed, in 1962, Education Minister Jaime Torres Bodet indicated the need for private elements in the society to assist in meeting this critical need. Despite burgeoning metropolitan areas and the integration of regions within the nation by roads, railroads and airlines, Mexico remains a nation of small communities, many of these still isolated.

### III

The Mexican economy of the past two decades gives the over-all impression of a booming, developing and diversifying structure. While the emphasis has been on diversification and particularly industrialization, since the early 1950's the Mexican government has sought balanced development of the diverse sectors of the economy. Agricultural production has increased dramatically and has become more varied. Mexico is producing, in non-drought years, enough food to meet the minimum needs of its rapidly growing population as well as a wide range of raw materials suitable for domestic processing and manufacturing.

The infrastructure for an industrial economy has been created and expanded. During the past 30 years, available roads have increased 11-fold; steel production has increased 13-fold to a point where 1.75 million tons are produced annually and supply much of the nation's needs; six times as much electrical power is being generated; cement production exceeds three million tons a year; and the nationalized petroleum industry now produces enough petroleum to make the nation self-sufficient in this regard. This infrastructure has made possible the development of a wide range of producer and consumer goods manufacturing. Since 1940,

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<sup>1</sup> H. F. Cline, *Mexico, Revolution to Evolution, 1940-1960* (London, Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 116.

industrial production is up 400 per cent, accounting for a quarter of the gross national product. The gross national product has been rising at an annual rate of 6.5 per cent during this same two decade period.

This economic miracle has been accomplished by a combination of state and private enterprise. However, the planning and promoting of economic development has been done chiefly through the governmental agency Nacional Financiera, using both public and private capital. Although at present the major portion of the new capital for financing Mexican economic development comes from Mexican sources, foreign aid and investment have played an important role. These funds have come from international agencies, foreign governments, private banks and direct foreign investments. Between 1942 and 1959, Nacional Financiera has authorized loans totalling almost \$1 billion, of which one-third has been repaid.<sup>2</sup> In 1961, Mexico paid \$115 million in amortization and interest on its foreign loans.

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development through June, 1962, had made eleven loans to Mexico for transportation, electrical development and agricultural improvement amounting to \$387 million, the largest loan total extended by the World Bank in Latin America. During the initial 15 months of operation by the Inter-American Development Bank, Mexico received loans totalling \$28 million from this agency created to provide an additional source of capital to help promote economic growth and technical advance. The principal loans were earmarked for seven irrigation projects.

From World War II until mid-1962, United States financial aid to Mexico has exceeded \$600 million. The United States has contributed to Mexican financial stability (i.e., the International Monetary Fund Stabilization Agreement extended through 1963, providing a standby credit of \$75 million to protect the peso against devaluation and Mexico's exchange reserves against depletion), development loans and technical assis-

tance. The stabilizing assistance is as important as the direct development aid since political stability and economic growth are intimately related to financial stability.

In 1961, Mexico borrowed about \$250 million, and the United States Export-Import Bank provided almost 40 per cent. During the first year of the Alliance for Progress, Mexico received just over ten per cent of the \$1 billion allocated, standing third behind Brazil and Chile. The pattern has continued during the first half of 1962, with the Export-Import Bank providing over \$20 million for the purchase of United States machinery and for irrigation, and AID (Agency for International Development) providing, following President Kennedy's visit, \$20 million for credits to small farmers.

Private banks and institutional investors have provided funds through such governmental agencies as Nacional Financiera and Pemex (Petróleos Mexicanos). In June, 1962, the latter borrowed \$50 million for the building of petro-chemical plants. Direct private investment by foreigners has been sizeable since World War II. Approximately three-quarters of this capital has come from the United States and was directed principally toward manufacturing and commerce. The total direct American private investment at the beginning of López Mateos' term in 1958 has been estimated anywhere from \$800 million to \$1 billion.

#### IV

Adolfo López Mateos assumed the presidency at a time when the pressures from peasant and labor groups were becoming more open and vocal and when ideological rifts breached the facade of revolutionary unity as a result of both domestic and foreign policy differences. It was also the eve of the Cold War's sharpest intrusion in the hemisphere with Castro leading Cuba into the Communist camp. An administration that seeks to collaborate with diverse elements, to maintain unity, control and order, to balance social welfare and economic growth, to maintain revolutionary principles at home and abroad and still to face economic realities is bound to ap-

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 245.



pear vacillating and equivocal in its policies.

Perhaps this situation was summarized succinctly on July 1, 1960, when at Guaymas, López Mateos said, "My government is of the extreme left," but added the qualifying phrase "within the law." Many evidences of this can be indicated: revolutionary programs are being implemented, but by the use of more orthodox means. Land distribution has been speeded to a rate exceeded only during the Cárdenas period. However, peasants who seize lands illegally have been ousted by force. Foreign holdings in the field of the generation of electricity have been bought out, adding this major utility to the national control of petroleum and railroads accomplished earlier by the Revolution. However, most disturbing to foreign investors' confidence has been the trend toward encouraging, if not forcing, the "Mexicanization" of the automotive and mining industries. In addition, the administration has taken the initial step of a constitutional amendment to make effective the long standing goal of workers' sharing in profits.

This economic policy combined with what was regarded as Mexico's equivocal foreign policy to produce deleterious effects for the Mexican economy. Tourism, which helps Mexico to maintain a favorable balance of payments despite an unfavorable balance of trade, declined in 1961. Compared with \$100 million of new United States capital attracted in 1960, less than half that amount was invested in 1961. Worse still was the large quantity of foreign and Mexican capital which left the country. The gross national product rose only 3.5 per cent in 1961, the smallest increase in 20 years, barely enough to keep pace with population growth. The Banco Nacional de Comercio sadly observed that "Mexico's economy in 1961 was maintained at a level of virtual stagnation."<sup>3</sup>

There are evidences both in word and deed that the Mexican government is anxious to reverse this trend. In 1962, a combination of United States and Mexican investors were

permitted to take over the operation of the government shipyard at Veracruz. Private investors were invited to aid in the extension of gas pipelines and to participate in iron ore development in the Jalisco-Colima area. Tax exemptions were granted to profits reinvested during the second quarter of 1962. Mexican government officials publicly have emphasized that Mexico needs and would welcome capital to regain lost industrial growth momentum. However, it also remains clear that indirect investments are preferred to direct. Direct investments are acceptable principally when associated in a minority position with Mexican capital or when they are long term investments in fields which are not already served by Mexican capital.<sup>4</sup>

## V

Mexican foreign policy regarding the Cuban problem has been regarded by many as equivocal and is often advanced as one reason for shaken confidence in the nation. On the one hand are Mexico's Western traditions and democratic tendencies as well as friendship with the United States. On the other hand is a complex Gordian knot created by domestic politics, historical principles and the world situation.

For almost a quarter of a century, an era of good feeling with the United States has done much to erase historical bitterness.

The Mexicans are political realists. They cannot ignore the geographical propinquity of the United States or the vital nature of their economic relations with the northern neighbor. The importance of American aid, investments and tourism has been mentioned. Noteworthy, too, is the fact that in recent years approximately three-fourths of Mexico's imports have been from the United States and close to two-thirds of her exports go north of the border.

Of course there are problems. The United States recently complained about marijuana smuggling and is disturbed by the "Mexicanization" trend of Mexican economic policy and limitations on the operations of United States shrimp fishermen. Mexico, during the past year, expressed her unhappiness about the

<sup>3</sup> *Hispanic American Report* (Vol. XV, No. 4), June, 1962, p. 304.

<sup>4</sup> *Hispanic American Report* (Vol. XV, No. 5), July, 1962, p. 399.

salinity of the water being received from the Colorado River in the Mexicali area, about discriminatory practices by the United States in marketing (cotton) or import restrictions (lead and zinc). Mexico pressed for the stabilization of the prices of key raw materials. The binational agreement on migratory workers (braceros), who have been slowly declining in numbers, was modified and extended through 1963; the long standing dispute over El Chamizal (territory near El Paso affected by nineteenth century shifts in the Rio Grande's course) has been referred to technical advisors to work out a solution; and President Kennedy has requested from qualified experts recommendations as to means to solve the salinity problem.

During López Mateos' term, Mexico has witnessed the appearance of two political groupings on the right and left within the revolutionary family. Taking ex-Presidents Alemán and Cárdenas as their rallying points, these two groups diverge sharply on domestic and Cuban policies. López Mateos astutely sought to cut the ground from under both movements by appointing seven ex-presidents, including Alemán and Cárdenas, to administrative posts within his government. Part of his seemingly paradoxical policy has resulted from the government's efforts to maintain unity and to satisfy diverse elements.

The second factor contributing to Mexico's international posture is the result of the guiding principles which are rooted in Mexico's historical experiences and were solidified during the Revolution. National sovereignty, the juridical equality of nations, self-determination and non-intervention are the pillars of Mexico's foreign policy. Add to these the revolutionary goal of independence in the fullest sense of the word and an international situation which presents a more favorable milieu for independent determination of policy by smaller nations. Then one begins to see the reasons why Mexico has acted as she has regarding Cuba.

When the Castro rebellion against Batista began, there was considerable sympathy for the movement in Mexico as elsewhere in Latin America. Mexicans could appreciate the

struggle against the dictator, the antagonism against foreign capitalism and the drive for reform. They were flattered by a movement that seemed to parallel their own revolutionary upheaval. While there has been a notable cooling due to the Soviet military buildup in Cuba, Castro's efforts to export his revolution and the Cuban revolutionary leader's avowal of Marxism-Leninism, Mexico's position remains fairly consistent on the basic issues involved in the Cuban situation.

In 1960, in Costa Rica, where Mexico signed the San José declaration, the nations went on record as opposing intervention by either extracontinental or American powers and affirmed that the Inter-American system was incompatible with any form of totalitarianism. These principles have continued to represent the Mexican position as Castro's Cuba drifted more firmly within the Communist sphere and the United States invoked hemispheric obligations as a basis for stronger measures.

In December, 1961, Mexico opposed a Colombian proposal to hold a consultative meeting of foreign ministers in regard to the Cuban situation. The Mexican opposition was based on juridical grounds, which even the Colombian Foreign Minister admitted were respectable. However, Mexico found herself voting with Cuba against the meeting, while some of the other nations she had expected to join her abstained. Still convinced that her position was sound, Mexico recognized that she had suffered a diplomatic set-

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*This article examines Peru's foreign and domestic problems and her role in the cold war. "The place of Peru in the present confusions of the world is not easily assessed. She obviously shares the disabilities which afflict all of the other underdeveloped peoples: her high illiteracy, her somber poverty, her lag-gard democracy make her prey to the demagogues of both the Left and the Right."*

## Peru in Serious Trouble

By HUBERT HERRING

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**F**OURTH LARGEST in area of the Latin American republics and twice the size of Texas, Peru bulks about 496,223 square miles, with a maximum width of 800 miles and a coast line 1,410 miles long. Of its total population of some 10,365,000, more than half are Amerindians, more than 30 per cent are of mixed bloods (mestizos or cholos), and about 10 per cent are white—with a scattering of Chinese and Japanese.

### COAST; SIERRA; MONTAÑA

Peru is a land of three well-marked areas. Coastal Peru is a narrow ribbon, a wind-swept desert bare of all vegetation save on the rare oases watered by 50 little rivers which slice their way down from the snowbanks. Less than one-tenth of the national domain, the coast houses about one-fifth of all Peruvians. The high Sierra, framed by the three-pronged Andes, occupies about 63 per cent of the nation's land and is the home of three-fourths of the people. The montaña, a wet jungle lying on the eastern slopes of the Andes, accounts for 28 per cent of Peru's territory, and is occupied by less than 5 per cent of the total population. All is dominated by the capital, Lima, a proud and graceful city of more than 1,200,000, where the first families live—the families who control most of the best land of

the Republic, who own the banks and leading industries, and who dominate most of the national decisions.

Peru is today in serious trouble (as, indeed, are most of the republics of Latin America). Its troubles represent the accumulation of ills from 137 years of independent life, and these in turn were rooted in its three centuries as a colony of Spain. It is characteristic of Peru that there was no profound will to freedom in the first decades of the nineteenth century, a period during which most of her neighbors were breaking from Spain and founding independent nations. Peru was the most feudal of all the areas of Spanish America, content with the domination of viceroys, against whom there were only sporadic outbreaks. When independence finally came in 1824, it came as a result of the proddings of San Martín in the South and Bolívar in the North, not because of any real impetus from the handful of creoles who were the masters in Lima. Independence simply brought a switch from the rule of the viceroys to that of the caudillos, the men on horseback, who maintained their hold on the country most of the time from 1824 to the present.

The social ills of Peru are only too clear. This considerable land and people have never attained any true sense of being a nation.

Lima—"the city of the kings," founded by Pizarro in 1535—is Peru. Here the political and economic power of the nation has always been concentrated—and still is. A disproportionate share of the national budget for education, health facilities, and public works has been allocated to the *limeños*. No outlying city, neither Trujillo nor Arequipa nor Cuzco, has ever been more than a sleepy outpost of the nation.

The thousands of little towns and villages scattered over the altiplano house the miserable tenants of a nation whose existence they hardly recognize. The workers on the great haciendas in the highlands, and to a somewhat lesser degree those on the coastal oases, have been and still are little more than the serfs of a feudal land. A Peruvian boasts that he has bought such and such an hacienda of 100,000 acres in the Sierra, and that with the land he also acquired so many hundreds of families of Indians. Such feudal arrangements have long since been barred by the laws of the nation, but they continue to exist.

The Peruvians are an unlettered people. The official figures set illiteracy at 57.6 per cent, but that is probably an optimistic count. There are fairly good schools for the well-born and economically privileged in Lima and the larger cities, scattered schools of dubious quality in the more substantial towns, and few schools in the villages.

The Peruvians, most of them, are a poor people. The available statistics are meager and unsatisfactory. The current figure\* for per capita annual income in Peru, about \$108, means, of course, that the fine income of the families who own the gracious homes in Lima and its suburbs, many with distinguished collections of paintings and sculpture, must be averaged in with the paltry receipts of the dwellers in the slums. In and around Lima are the *barriadas*, where human beings barely exist, squatters on lands which no one claims. One can look at the miserable villages of India, the packed slums of Ceylon, Hong Kong, Egypt, but there is no poverty in such

lands more acute than that found within a few minutes' drive of the glittering, luxurious boulevards of Lima. Usually with inadequate water supply, often without sewers, lighted by little electricity, shunned by the police, these hapless groups of pitiful huts give scant shelter to more than half the people of Lima. And in the towns of the highlands, Huancayo, Juliaca, Puno, Ayacucho, Tarma, Cajamarca, not to mention the tiny villages, the misery is compounded.

Poverty goes hand in hand with inadequate health facilities. Recent figures indicate that there is one physician for each 2,937 people, one dentist for each 9,960, one hospital bed for each 500 (comparable figures for the United States are 795, 1,890, and 101). The life expectancy of a Peruvian, at birth, is 46.1 years (in the United States it is about 70 years). On infant mortality, about 88 out of each thousand babies born alive die within their first year (in the United States the figure is about 26.9). The annual increase in the population is about 2.5 per cent, a rate higher than India's.

The poverty of Peru is intimately related to its scarcity of arable land. Too much of Peru's substantial area is in desert, mountains, and as yet untamed jungle. Of the total area of 496,233 square miles, only about 1.33 per cent is described as arable land, and this includes cultivated meadows and pastures. While there are only about 29 persons for each square mile of her national territory (as compared to 57 for the United States, excluding Alaska), there are about 1,576 persons for each square mile of arable land (compared to 433 in Mexico, 178 in Argentina, and 244 in the United States). About ten per cent of the national area is in rough grazing lands, but most of these are the bleak and barren sides of mountains, fit to sustain only a few goats and adventurous cattle. About 56 per cent of the national area is in forests. The bald fact is that Peru does not have enough land to produce adequate foodstuffs for its people.

All of this social and economic miscasting of the nation is rendered more tragic by the inflexibility and intolerance of the class struc-

\* I am indebted for most of the statistics in this article to the Center of Inter-American Studies of the University of California in Los Angeles.

ture. The "best" people—those who have good houses, those who own land and businesses and factories—inherit the pride and the insolence of the few families who dominated colonial Peru. There are a few thousand, no more, of the "best" people, and, of these, two or three score are all-powerful economically. The middle class with white collars are late comers: they form but a thin slice, except in Lima and Arequipa and Trujillo, and for the most part they live meagerly. The great masses—toilers on the farms, hands in the factories, carriers of water, domestic servants—constitute 80 to 90 or 95 per cent of the more than ten million Peruvians.

### THE ECONOMY

The Peruvian economy shows some signs of vigor. The nation is self-sufficient in petroleum, coal and almost all metals. The generation of electricity has increased hopefully (from 1.485 million KWH in 1955 to 2.212 million KWH in 1959, an increase of 162.3 per cent). There are numerous hydroelectric projects on the drawing boards. Industrialization is expanding, with more than 15 per cent of the workers of Peru engaged in manufacturing. Farming still stands first in number of workers, accounting for about 62 per cent of the entire labor force. The chief export items in 1960 were cotton (17 per cent of all exports), sugar (11 per cent), and iron ore (7.5 per cent). Economists continue to point out that Peru would be better off if the lands devoted to sugar and cotton (both of these monopolizing most of the fine oases on the coast) could gradually be switched to a greater variety of foodstuffs for the hungry Peruvian population.

Meanwhile, the low per capita annual income figure of \$108.45 continues to disturb the consciences of Peruvians. Reflecting the general poverty is the inadequacy of the national budget: in 1959, national expenditures bulked about \$279 million, incurring a deficit of over \$80 million.

The social and economic illness of Peru is reflected in her political course. Throughout the first century of her independent life

(1824–1939), there was no election which could be described as honest and democratic. Dictators of various degrees of competence, or lack of it, followed each other in monotonous file. Since 1939, there has been a slight improvement. Manuel Prado (1939–1945) and José Luis Bustamante (1945–1948) were somewhat honestly elected. Next came two terms for Manuel Odría (1948–1950 and 1950–1956), a strong-armed and able dictator who abused his presidential powers by handling the ballot boxes for his own ends. Then Manuel Prado (1956–1962) obtained power by an honest election, but his administration's weakness was only partially redeemed by the installing of wise Pedro Beltrán as premier. Thoughtful Peruvians looked hopefully to the election of June, 1962, with the wan determination that this time Peru could prove her political maturity.

As preparations were under way for the election of June, 1962, three chief candidates appeared on the scene. The obdurate Manuel Odría entered his name for another term. He was much admired by the older army contingents and by many business interests, including many who deplored his dictatorial ways, but gratefully remembered that he had managed the republic's economy in orderly fashion. Opposing him were two candidates of somewhat leftish persuasion. Fernando Belaúnde, a handsome architect not yet turned 50, had proved his competence as a vote-getter in 1956 when he almost succeeded in defeating Prado after less than six weeks of campaigning. His stand on national affairs was somewhat unclear: he sought to please Rightists by a most vocal nationalism, and to carry along those of the Left by conciliatory gestures to the Communists. And the third contender was the ever-present and highly controversial Haya de la Torre.

Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre, now 67, has been the stormy center of disputes in Peru for 40 years. During much of that period he has spent many months in jail or in exile, and for five years he found asylum from Dictator Odría's fury in the Colombian Embassy in Lima. His political trouble began in 1923



at the age of 17, when, as a student in Peru's 400-year-old University of San Marcos, he organized student demonstrations against the dictatorship of Augusto Leguía. Exiled by Leguía, he retreated to Mexico, then in the throes of revolutionary excitement, and organized the political party which is famous all over Latin America as the A.P.R.A. (*alianza popular revolucionaria americana*).

A.P.R.A.'s program was provocative and many-sided: some of its proposals sounded communistic, others had fascist coloration. Latin America was to be united into a gigantic federation; the Panama Canal was to be internationalized; the peasants were to be endowed with land; and industrial workers were to unite to do battle with imperialists and capitalist wrongdoers. The movement caught fire in Peru almost immediately, and its secret membership grew steadily. But it had little effect elsewhere in Latin America. In 1926, Haya visited the Soviet Union, but he was soon engaged in vocal disputes with the Communists.

In 1931, he returned to Peru and ran for the presidency. Probably he got more votes than his opponents. But the army would not accept him, installed the unlovely Sánchez Cerro without counting the votes, and sent Haya to jail. Finally released by President Benavides early in 1933, Haya lived a strange life of hiding in and around the city of Lima. The current dictators found it expedient not to ferret him out for they knew that he commanded a larger following than anyone in power.

In 1945, Haya threw the weight of his Apristas behind a colorless nonentity named Bustamante, and as a reward, his party was allotted three places in the cabinet, his appointee was made rector of the University of San Marcos, and Haya himself was granted freedom to preach his doctrine as he willed. With such power in his hands, he disappointed his admirers by failing to fulfill his promises; he had shown his talents as an agitator, but proved powerless as an administrator.

Meanwhile, the army, headed by Manuel Odría, grew hourly more angry, and after three years of Bustamante's (and Haya's)

rule, threw out both Bustamante and the Apristas. Again Haya was on the run, this time to the Colombian Embassy as a refugee, for five years of lonely waiting. Released in 1953, Haya went to Europe, keeping in touch with his lieutenants in Peru who were now headed by the nimble Priale. In 1956 he returned to Peru. When he discovered that his candidacy was hopeless, he helped to elect the inept Manuel Prado to the presidency. Then, in June, 1962, Haya de la Torre again entered the lists as a candidate for the presidency on the platform of "a democratic fight against communism."

### THE 1962 ELECTION

The election of June, 1962, shook Peru more vigorously than any election ever held. Odría, grim and unabashed by all the charges brought against him, promised "order"; Belaúnde and Haya both promised all sorts of social reforms (in fact, there was little difference between their platforms). In the slow count of votes, Odría was quickly out-distanced. Haya crept ahead of Belaúnde with a margin of about 15,000 votes. But no candidate had the required 35 per cent of the total votes, which meant that the issue must be decided by the Peruvian parliament. There were frantic negotiations, but neither Belaúnde nor Haya would consent to join forces. Although they sounded very much alike to the casual observer, neither could abide the other. It soon became clear that the army was adamant; elections must be free, of course, but under no circumstances could Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre be president of the Republic of Peru. So there was a deadlock during June and July of 1962.

The army had the last word, as it has always had throughout Peru's history. On July 18, 1962, the generals directed an attack on the presidential palace: a Sherman tank (part of the bounty allotted to the Peruvian army by the United States government) crashed through the gates of the palace on the Plaza de Armas, seized President Manuel Prado, and imprisoned him on a military transport ship in Callao's harbor. Criticism of our military aid policies, by which we had

long helped to arm dictatorial governments, again appeared. In Washington, Ernest Gruening, Senator from Alaska and long-time student of Latin American affairs, led the onslaught. Not only had an American tank been used to attack the duly elected president of Peru, but the general who led the attack had been trained at American expense in the United States. Meanwhile the Peruvian military leaders installed a governing junta of four generals, with Major General Ricardo Pérez Godoy as the titular chief. The junta forbade the convening of Congress, suspended constitutional guarantees, and promised a free election as soon as was feasible, a promise interpreted as meaning before July, 1963.

The reaction of the United States was swift: diplomatic relations with Peru were severed; military assistance was shut off; and almost all aid programs were discontinued. These moves seem to have been inspired by the American Ambassador in Peru, James Loeb, who became the target of abuse by those who favored the military coup. However, second thoughts in Washington led to a quick reversal, and on August 17, diplomatic relations were restored, 30 days after the break. At the same time, all American aid—except military—was resumed: this aid totalled about \$66.7 million, including \$25.3 million in loans from AID for housing, roads, and rural resettlement; \$4.5 million in grants for technical assistance in agriculture, industry, health, education, and housing; \$36.9 million in Export-Import Bank loans for roads, industry, agricultural and industrial banks. But military grants for \$22 million were withheld.

There was general agreement that the United States had lost face in this quick withdrawal, and then quick resumption, of recognition. Ambassador Loeb, it was shortly announced, would not return to Lima. Behind the decisions which had been thus abruptly made was the conclusion in Washington that the bulk of sober public opinion in Lima actually favored the actions of the military junta. It seemed clear that, no matter how thoroughly responsible Peruvians (and not only those of conservative persuasion) dis-

liked military intervention in government, they were deeply suspicious of the ability of Haya de la Torre to conduct the affairs of the government.

This suspicion was increased when Haya expressed willingness to unite with Odría in the control of the nation. That last piece of opportunism went far to destroy Haya's already waning prestige. Meanwhile the junta sought to appease Haya and the Apristas by promising that the "free election" of 1963 would be open to all parties, including the Apristas. If the Apristas were not entirely convinced by this promise, the justification for their doubts seems clear.

### FOREIGN POLICY

The place of Peru in the present confusions of the world is not easily assessed. She obviously shares the disabilities which afflict all of the other underdeveloped peoples: her high illiteracy, her somber poverty, her lag-gard democracy make her prey to the demagogues of both the Left and the Right. But, at the moment at least, Peru remains remarkably isolated against outside disorders. Her relations with her neighbors Chile, Bolivia, and Brazil are relatively amicable. Only Ecuador openly resents Peru and would make trouble if she could, for Ecuador has again and again lost territory to her more powerful neighbor, and entertains lively fears of further raids from the South.

Peru's relations with the United States are on the whole serene, in spite of occasional outbursts of nationalism and anti-North Americanism. These outbursts have various explanations. United States capital is too

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*"During the months of parliamentary government, the furor over chronic political indecision and continued rampant inflation served to obscure the fact that Brazil preserved its open political system and basically free economy," observes this specialist, who points out that "Despite strong pressures from the right and the left, the extremes of military coup d'état and social revolution were averted."*

## Imbalance in Brazil

By ROLLIE E. POPPINO

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The motto on the Brazilian flag reads *Ordem e Progresso*, order and progress. This bit of Positivist philosophy, calling for political stability and economic growth, was adopted as a national aspiration when Brazil became a republic. For nearly three-quarters of a century, Brazilian leaders have been striving for a satisfactory balance between the two aspects of the national goal. Seldom has the need for order and progress been more pressing, and seldom have the obstacles appeared so insurmountable.

The problems involved in preserving institutional stability while sustaining a rising rate of economic development have been compounded by the injection into the political milieu of virulent nationalism and the clamor for social justice. The millions of Brazilian citizens who have been drawn actively into the political and economic life of the nation since the war are now demanding sweeping social and economic reforms to raise their living standards and enhance their sense of personal dignity. At the same time, spurred by the intense feeling of nationalism—encouraged by all political parties—a majority of the public is insisting that the government tighten controls over foreign investment in Brazil and follow a completely "independent" policy in international affairs.

The pressures for social justice at home and great power status abroad are too strong and widespread to be ignored by any political figure. Complete acquiescence to these pressures, however, would jeopardize both the existing political order and Brazil's continued rapid economic expansion. Immediate reforms on a scale adequate to meet the demands of labor, peasants, and the lower middle class would alienate the politically powerful propertied groups and the armed forces while straining the nation's economy beyond its present limits. Adoption of a nationalistic policy has already begun to alarm potential sources of foreign—chiefly United States—public and private developmental capital, on which the high rate of economic growth depends. The range of palatable alternative courses of action to break this dilemma has been narrowed almost to the vanishing point.

None of these problems is entirely new to Brazil. Each administration in the past decade tried a different approach, but none was able to resolve all of them, even temporarily. President Getulio Vargas emphasized economic nationalism and sought to placate the working class. He was deposed in 1954 by a military-conservative alliance which feared his actions as a threat to political stability.

The caretaker regime that succeeded him stressed the need for economic orthodoxy, but was unwilling to enforce an austerity program that adversely affected property holders. Juscelino Kubitschek, who was elected president in 1955 on the promise of "fifty years progress in five," encouraged spectacular economic development at the price of equally spectacular inflation. He did little to disturb landholders and industrialists at home, and in foreign relations preserved Brazil's traditionally close ties with the United States.

In 1960, the political maverick, Jânio Quadros, was elected to the presidency by an overwhelming margin on the strength of his pledges to restore order to the economy without slowing the rate of expansion, to meet the most pressing demands for social reforms, to pursue a vigorously independent foreign policy, and to do all this without violating the sanctity of Brazilian institutions. He succeeded in reorienting Brazil's foreign policy by expanding diplomatic and trade relations with the Soviet bloc and opposing the United States on the Cuban issue, but failed to make any significant advances on the domestic front during his brief term.

### **A GOVERNMENT CRISIS**

In a startling and unexpected move, President Quadros resigned in August, 1961, protesting that the congress and certain unspecified "interests" had made it impossible for him to carry out the will of the people. His resignation left a temporary power vacuum, for his constitutional successor, Vice President João Goulart, was then on a state visit to Communist China. A power struggle ensued between the army high command, determined to prevent the installation of Goulart as chief of state, and the congress, which was equally determined to preserve civilian control over the government. The army leaders and conservatives generally regarded the controversial Goulart, political heir of Getulio Vargas and head of the left-of-center Brazilian Labor Party, as a dangerous radical who would upset the political system and disrupt economic progress. The politicians' dedication to the principle of constitutional order and civilian

rule, however, proved stronger than the military will.

After a week of tension in which the army split and civil war threatened, the problem was resolved by a compromise which is typically Brazilian. On September 2, 1961, congress approved an Additional Act to the constitution, which introduced the parliamentary form of government. Goulart was sworn into office as president, but executive authority and responsibility were vested largely in a council of ministers drawn from the congress. For the past 18 months the parliamentary system has been the new and crippling element in Brazilian politics.

There is nothing inherent in parliamentary rule that necessarily makes it unsuitable for Brazil. In fact, the nation had a parliamentary government for more than six decades in the nineteenth century. But in the present situation it has failed to meet the demands placed on it. This is hardly surprising. Only a small minority of the congressmen, who had long been advocating parliamentarianism as the logical system in a multi-party government, were enthusiastic about its adoption. The majority accepted it only under strong pressure as a temporary expedient to avert civil conflict and to withhold from Goulart the extensive powers usually enjoyed by Brazilian presidents. The Act itself provided that the electorate should have the opportunity, before the expiration of Goulart's term on January 31, 1966, to decide whether the new system was to continue. The date for the plebiscite was not set.

The experiment with parliamentary government thus began under inauspicious circumstances, and events combined to prevent it from functioning effectively. President Goulart accepted its restraints on his authority but made his resentment clear from the outset. He was unable to command congressional support for any controversial measures, while the congress, divided among twelve different parties, lacked the cohesion to impose its will consistently on him or the council of ministers. In practice, the parliamentary system in Brazil placed a premium on inaction. The diffusion of executive power among the con-

gress, the council of ministers, and the president denied to any of them the opportunity to derive full political credit for their accomplishments and permitted each to blame the others for their shortcomings. Opponents of parliamentarianism were also prompt to attribute to the system responsibility for the government's failure to resolve problems demanding immediate attention.

There were many critics. Party leaders frustrated by the political stalemate, Kubitschek and other potential presidential candidates in 1965, and state governors anxious to prevent extension of the system to their jurisdictions were increasingly outspoken in demanding the return to the presidential system. Under the circumstances, the question of retention or rejection of parliamentary rule pervaded and distorted debate on every political issue during 1962.

By mid-year it was evident that the decision could not be postponed indefinitely. Goulart and his supporters proposed an immediate plebiscite. The congress refused. Goulart then insisted that the plebiscite be held simultaneously with the congressional and gubernatorial elections on October 7. Again the congress refused, countering with various proposals for constitutional amendments that would alter the form but not the substance of the parliamentary system. These failed to attract the required two-thirds majority. The debate forced the resignation of the council of ministers in mid-September, but produced a compromise acceptable to Goulart and the majority in congress.

The compromise solution contained three main points. It provided that the plebiscite would be held on January 6, 1963. At that time the electorate would choose between the parliamentary system and the presidential system that had existed prior to September, 1961. The new congress would have the option, for three months and by simple majority vote, to modify whichever form of government the people had chosen. After the October elections, Goulart's opponents in the lame duck congress persisted in their efforts to pass constitutional amendments to abolish the Additional Act. Their aim was to eliminate the

need for a plebiscite and the possibility of a resounding vote in favor of the presidential system, which would be interpreted as a popular mandate for Goulart. At the time this article is being written the outcome of these maneuvers is still in doubt, but it appears likely that they will fail and that the plebiscite will be held as scheduled.

The fact that nation-wide elections were to be held in October also strengthened the tendency to postpone decisions on critical issues during 1962. It was generally accepted in political circles that the popular mandate given to Quadros in 1960 had been cancelled by his resignation. By this reasoning neither Goulart, whose claim to the presidency had been strongly contested, nor the congress, which had not been renewed since 1958, was clearly authorized to embark on a broad program to deal with the social and economic problems facing the nation. Under the circumstances both pro- and anti-Goulart factions were prone to look to the elections for an indication of the kind of program desired by the people and for the congressional majority capable of enacting such a program.

## ELECTIONS OF 1962

The elections that took place on October 7, 1962, were as fair and orderly as any ever held in Brazil. They stand as eloquent testimony to the determination of the Brazilian government and people to resolve their problems by constitutional means, but they proved disappointing to political leaders seeking broad approval for any specific line of action within the limits of Brazil's traditional institutions. Over 17 million voters—about one-half of the adult population—were registered, and indications are that the overwhelming majority of them went to the polls. At stake were 45 of the 66 Senate seats, the entire Chamber of Deputies, which was increased from 326 to 409 members following the results of the 1960 census, 11 state governors, 9 vice governors, all state assemblies, and a substantial portion of the municipal offices across the country.

By and large the voters rejected extremists of the right and the left, returning middle-of-the-road candidates to most offices and leav-



ing the complexion of the congress substantially unchanged. In Guanabara and Pernambuco, where the campaign was polarized between conservatives and radicals, this pattern was broken with the victory going to left-wing candidates. The most prominent of these are Leonel Brizola, Goulart's brother-in-law and outgoing governor of Rio Grande do Sul, who ran well ahead of all other candidates for congress in the former capital, and Miguel Arraes, controversial mayor of Recife, who won the governorship of Pernambuco by a narrow margin. Both made anti-United States nationalism a central feature of their campaign propaganda. In São Paulo, however, former President Quadros was soundly defeated in his bid for a political comeback as champion of the common man. On the whole, the elections reflected the continued gradual, leftward trend in Brazilian politics, but reaffirmed the tendency of the electorate to choose moderates when given the opportunity.

The spirit of moderation shown by the electorate seems surprising in view of the politicians' inability to check the inflationary spiral which raised living costs more than 40 per cent in 1961 and over 50 per cent in the first ten months of 1962. The absence of revolt at the polls was accounted for in large part by the facility of Brazil's political leaders to match rising living costs with comparable wage increases and the emission of new currency. In 1961, the printing presses ran off 107.5 billion new cruzeiros, 52 per cent more than in 1960. By the first week of November, 1962, an additional 110 billion cruzeiros were in circulation. A great deal of this new money went to pay wage increases won through labor strikes and a 40 per cent increase granted in May to all military and civilian personnel on the federal payroll. The congress resisted pressure for a substantial rise in the minimum wage for 1962 but authorized payment of a year-end bonus equivalent to one month's pay for all salaried employees.

As a direct result of inflation, the government encountered serious difficulties in maintaining adequate food supplies at reasonable prices in the larger cities in 1962. A violent

food riot in the Rio de Janeiro suburbs in July, which left ten dead and scores wounded, pointed up the explosive nature of this problem. The administration subsequently took action to overhaul its price support and control machinery and arranged for additional shipments of wheat from the United States. The cruzeiro proceeds from the sale of such wheat are destined largely for official economic development programs, coordinated and directed by Celso Furtado, who was given extensive economic powers as Minister Without Portfolio in late September, 1962.

After the October elections, the council of ministers drew up plans for some long-term measures to reduce the rate of inflation to 10 per cent by 1965. These included a new minimum wage bill designed to hold the line on wages for the remainder of Goulart's term. The bill provided for increases of 35 per cent or more in the major cities and up to 100 per cent in the depressed northeastern states. The highest monthly minimum was to be roughly equivalent to \$30 at the November, 1962, rate of exchange. The council also introduced a new tax bill, raising the rate on personal incomes to a maximum of 60 per cent and on corporate profits to 23 per cent, and introducing a 40 per cent ad valorem tax on luxuries. The new wage and tax rates were to go into effect on January 1. But even with the additional income to be provided by higher taxes, the administration anticipated that its total revenues would amount to less than half of the national budget in 1963. Before the end of the year, Brazilian authorities went to Europe to draw on a previously negotiated stand-by credit and the finance ministry was preparing to appeal to the United States for massive emergency assistance.

It is easy to exaggerate the negative factors in the Brazilian economy. The precarious state of the government's finances, however, stands in stark contrast to the boom in the industrial sector which continued through 1962. Real production was increasing at the rate of seven per cent a year, the highest in Latin America and one of the highest in the world, while per capita production, rising at

four per cent a year, continued to outstrip population growth. Despite inequities in distribution, per capita real income approximately doubled in the past decade and, because of inflation, there was a continuing pressure to spend money before it lost value. Much of the increased purchasing power was spent on household appliances and other Brazilian manufactures. Brazil now has the largest domestic market for consumer goods in Latin America, and the market is growing both in numbers and area. Between 1955 and 1960, the bulk of new investments in industry went to the São Paulo region. In 1962, in response to attractive tax incentives, 60 per cent of investments in plant expansion and new industries were made in the Northeast, where the potential market is equal to the existing one in the center and south of the country. Thus, in spite of inflation and doubts about future government policies toward foreign capital, private United States, Japanese, and West European firms continued to enter Brazil during the year, although at a much lower rate than in the peak period, 1959-1960.

#### LAFTA AND TRADE

Both government and industry in Brazil took keen interest in the possibilities of the Latin American Free Trade Area during 1962, for they anticipate that the elimination of trade barriers will bring the La Plata region and a good deal of the rest of Latin America within the reach of Brazilian exporters. In 1961, Brazil's total exports to the other Latin American republics amounted to only \$115 million, of which about \$8 million was in manufactured items. Both figures should be substantially higher for 1962. For example, Brazil's trade with Mexico was sufficient to justify inauguration of a direct shipping line to Tampico in February. Mexico is becoming an important market for Brazilian electrical equipment. In April, a consortium of Brazilian firms, competing against Japanese, European, and Soviet bloc bidders, won a contract to supply 150 railroad cars to Uruguay. Brazilian-made buses were also a significant item in Latin American trade; 3,600

were sold to Argentina and other countries during the year.

Trade with Latin America is attractive to Brazil in part because it does not require large expenditures of hard currencies, which are in short supply. This same consideration has encouraged successive administrations in recent years to look also to the Soviet bloc for new markets and for non-dollar sources of essential imports. The expansion of trade with Communist countries, which was a major objective of Quadros' foreign policy, has continued under Goulart. In 1961, while Brazil's total trade was increasing by less than 4 per cent over the 1960 level, commerce with Eastern Europe rose by 37 per cent. When figures are available, they should reveal another substantial increase for 1962. The renewal of diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R., Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania in 1961 was followed in 1962 by approval of new bilateral trade agreements with these countries and with Czechoslovakia and Poland. The bulk of Brazil's trade with the bloc is confined to Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union, involving the exchange of coffee, cacao, iron ore, hides, fibers, and vegetable oils for Soviet wheat and petroleum, Polish ships, rails, and railroad equipment, and a broad range of industrial machinery and other manufactured articles from all three countries.

Trade with the Soviet bloc has relieved some of the pressure on Brazil's balance of payments, but is not the panacea its leading advocates have predicted. The nation's overall balance of trade deficit was running at about \$160 million for the first nine months of 1962. One of the limitations on trade with the bloc arises from the fact that under existing treaties, imports and exports are expected to balance each year. Thus, Brazil's exports can be increased only to the extent that its imports of bloc merchandise are increased. Brazilian importers, however, prefer Western products over comparable items manufactured in the Soviet bloc, even when these are available on favorable credit terms. This problem was pointed up in November, 1962, by Brazil's ambassador to Warsaw, who noted

that Brazilian importers had failed to take advantage of credit offered by Poland on 160 different products, and that as a result coffee sales had declined sharply. Both the Brazilian and bloc governments agreed during 1962 on the desirability of long-term trade and payments arrangements, to provide greater latitude in settling commercial accounts and to expand the volume and number of commodities exchanged.

### AN INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY

The maintenance of close and friendly relations with the Soviet bloc also reflected the determination of the Brazilian government to follow an "independent" foreign policy. It is widely held in Brazil that the nation has reached a level of material development and political maturity that entitles it to a full and equal voice with the major powers in international councils. Such a position, in the Brazilian view, is incompatible with complete identification or subordination to any international bloc. Brazil's broad objectives are to promote world peace by encouraging disarmament and coexistence on the one hand and rapid economic progress of underdeveloped nations on the other. These aims were eloquently reaffirmed by Brazilian delegates at sessions of the Geneva disarmament conference during the year. The election of Brazil—for the fourth time since 1946—to a non-permanent seat in the Security Council of the United Nations was interpreted by the government as confirmation of the correctness of its international policies.

Nowhere was Brazil's assertion of its authority to follow its own policies and to express views contrary to those of the majority more apparent than in the debate over Cuba in the Organization of American States. While the Goulart administration abandoned Quadros' ostentatious displays of sympathy for the Castro regime, it persevered in opposition to any hemispheric actions that might be interpreted as intervention in Cuba or interference with the right of the Cuban people to determine the kind of government they would have. Brazilian spokesmen repeatedly lamented the fact that Cuba had departed

from the principle of representative democracy, but maintained that any effort by the Organization of American States to alter the situation by force would drive Cuba irretrievably into the Soviet camp.

Even after exposure of the Soviet missile base in Cuba, Brazilian authorities refused to admit the possibility that Castro had already accomplished this feat voluntarily. The adherence of the Goulart regime to this position frequently placed it in opposition to the United States and a majority of the Spanish American republics, causing considerable misgivings among moderates and conservatives at home and among friends of Brazil abroad. Even pro-Goulart elements in the military were disturbed by the fact that Brazil was the only Latin American nation to qualify its endorsement of the quarantine on arms shipments to Cuba in October.

Brazil's policy toward Cuba has been denounced by its critics as negative, irresponsible, and an expedient adopted to placate anti-United States extremists. It cannot be dismissed so simply. The basic difference of opinion centers on the extent of the danger to peace and hemispheric unity posed by Communist Cuba. If one can accept the Brazilian view that the threat of Communist infiltration and subversion from Cuba has been greatly exaggerated by the United States and the Caribbean nations, then Brazil's attitude on the Cuban question can be seen as a logical extension of its global policies. In

*(Continued on page 118)*

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Rollie E. Poppino served in the Office of Research and Intelligence of the Department of State, 1954–1961, and before that, in the History Department at Stanford University. He spent 10 months in Brazil studying for a doctoral dissertation in 1950–1951, and visited 10 Latin American nations. In 1957, he traveled to Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina; again, in 1958, he returned to Brazil for a research project. At the present time, Dr. Poppino is preparing a monograph on the Communist movement in Latin America, for publication in 1963.

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*After "viewing conditions and events in Guatemala," this specialist writes that "several things should be clear. The sending of guns and money is apparently the wrong kind of help, especially if the guns are used to suppress democratic tendencies and money is wasted or goes to the already affluent few."*

## Changing Conditions in Guatemala

By C. A. HAUBERG

*Associate Professor of History, St. Olaf College*

**M**OST LITERATE citizens of the United States have heard of Latin America, but not too many could describe the continent intelligently. A much smaller per cent could locate Central America and Guatemala, but practically no one could identify the state of Jutiapa. And yet today Jutiapa is the setting of a literary project that could be vital to the citizens of all the Americas.

In a recent interview with Ex-President José Figueres of Costa Rica the problems of Cuba and Guatemala were discussed. According to Figueres, Cuba is already a pawn in a chess game with Russia, but there may still be hope for Guatemala and other countries. Time, however, is a factor; "It is one minute to midnight in Latin America."<sup>1</sup> According to several observers . . . "the most significant event of 1961 . . . is the Alliance for Progress."<sup>2</sup>

On August 16, 1961, at Punta del Este, Uruguay, a charter was adopted by 20 American states including all the challenges exemplified by conditions in Guatemala: life ex-

pectancy, general health, infant mortality as well as a new hemispheric attack on illiteracy. Therefore, what happens in the departments, or states, of Guatemala is not only pertinent to Guatemala and Latin America, but to the United States as well.

### GEOGRAPHIC DIVERSITY

Guatemala means different things to different people. A student or a geographer might think of a country in a Latin American setting about the size of Tennessee or Kentucky—42,042 square miles. This is an area offering a great diversity of geography and climate; cool mountain plateaus surrounded by many volcanic peaks, some towering over 13,000 feet and still active; hot tropical jungles in the coastal areas; and even a semi-desert region, the middle part of Motagua Valley, where only xerophytic or cactus-like plants can grow.

Our hypothetical student might also think of people. Guatemalans are divided into two broad ethnic groups: Indian and Ladino. Apparently due to a shortage of funds no census was taken in 1960, but an official estimate of December 31 of that year placed the total population at 3,759,000. Fortunately for the social scientist, the 1950 census was a rather good one and from that count as well as the 1960 estimate one can safely conclude that Indians constitute about 54 per cent of the population and Ladinos 46 per cent.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Teodoro Moscoso, "How Freedom Can Win in Latin America" (This Week Magazine) *Minneapolis Sunday Tribune*, pp. 4-7.

<sup>2</sup> Victor Cohn, "Health Aids Warn about Restless Latin Americans," *Minneapolis Sunday Tribune*, August 26, 1962.

<sup>3</sup> *Statesman's Year Book, 1961-62*, p. 1085; Nathan L. Whetten, *Guatemala, the Land and the People*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1961, pp. 3, 19, 27, 44.

Generally speaking, Indians are those descendants of the pre-Colombian natives who have not adopted the ways of Western civilization. Ladinos are all those not classed as Indian. As one might expect, Guatemala is overwhelmingly rural in population—about 75 per cent.

If our investigator should be concerned chiefly with resources, he might take note of the timberlands, containing millions of board feet of valuable pine and other lumber as well as soil types that can produce almost any agricultural product known to mankind. Furthermore, located between Mexico on the northwest and Honduras and El Salvador on the southeast, Guatemala has ports on both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts.

The tourist might find Guatemala even more interesting than the geographer, especially if he is brave. But often tourists shun Guatemala. For is it not a country of revolutions, bombs, bad food and impure water?<sup>4</sup> Granted there are dangers and one must take some precautions, the results are worth the effort and gamble.

In the area above Guatemala City is Antigua, the old capital of Guatemala which was the most important city between Mexico and Lima in colonial times. It even boasted a well-established university when New York was a mere village. In the 1770's it was destroyed by recurrent earthquakes and deserted for Guatemala City.

Lake Atitlán, described by some as one of the most beautiful lakes in the world, is another attraction visitors should not miss. Surrounded by volcanoes San Pedro, San Lucas

and Atitlán, and with gem-blue waters too deep to sparkle, this lake presents a memorable sight. Nearby are the colorful native markets of Punajachel and Sololá. Even more interesting might be a visit to the village of Santo Tomás—probably better known by its Indian name Chichicastenango.

Officially, Guatemala is over 90 per cent Catholic but this is misleading. In the rural and especially Indian areas religion is a combination of diluted Catholic beliefs, blended with pagan indigenous practices. Such phenomena can be observed in an interesting manner at the village of Chichicastenango.<sup>5</sup>

### DESPOTS AND REVOLUTION

Guatemala also interests the historian. By and large, Guatemala has had fewer revolutions than many Latin American states, but it has known despotism. After Rafael Carrera's death in 1865, some of the dictator-presidents have been comparatively liberal. Justo Rufino Barrios (1871–1885), who has been characterized as able, intelligent, thorough, and harsh, can be thus classified. He promoted internal improvements and communications, encouraged coffee and banana production as well as crop diversification. But Barrios had little respect for the Indians and did little to improve their status. Jorge Ubico (1931–1944), although very much a dictator, promoted activities similar to those of Barrios and he posed as a friend of the abused Indians. Up to 1944, Guatemala had made some progress largely due to the policies of some benevolent dictators, but even so it was still a land of "mystery and whispers." Universal education, freedom and democracy were lacking.

After the defeat of the Jorge Ubico regime in 1944, Guatemala under Juan José Arévalo (1945–1950) entered a new epoch of "social revolution." A new constitution similar to the Mexican document of 1917 included guarantees for free institutions and for labor unions, and authorized land reform. For more than a century before, successive governments had been the tools of the military, the landlords and the foreign interests,

<sup>4</sup> In late June and early July of 1962 some 20–30 bombs exploded in Guatemala City. One leading U.S. newspaper blamed Castro and the Communists for these explosions. After investigation, including both informed Guatemalans as well as foreigners (businessmen largely), the writer is of the opinion that all the bombs during his stay were the work of the Guatemalan army itself, which controls the country at present. These glorified firecracker-bombs (no one was injured then) could serve the present government in several ways. The danger of a threat from Castro or the Communists could result in loans from the United States, and such strawman tactics could be used to suppress liberal thinking or free expression (so necessary in Guatemala) in the press, schools, or even in elections.

<sup>5</sup> Whetten, *op. cit.*, Chapter XIV.



and there was many an *Hombre olvidado* (forgotten man) in Guatemala.

According to Lewis Hanke, some of the basic problems which faced this reform movement were: inadequate transportation facilities, a one-crop economy, a largely illiterate population, domination by a few wealthy families—all of which adds up to economic and political instability.<sup>6</sup> In 1954 this reform movement was overthrown because of its friendly attitude towards communism. Another well-known authority, Professor Arthur P. Whitaker, has described this event as follows:

The reader may not have noticed, however, that with Washington's blessing, this solution was reached in the time-honored Central American way—armed invasion by exiles based on a neighboring country—just as if the United Nations and the O.A.S. had never come into existence.<sup>7</sup>

Since 1954 two strong-man dictator-type presidents have dominated Guatemala, Colonel Castillo Armas (1954 to his assassination in 1957) and presently Miguel Ydigoras—but bombs still explode in Guatemala and the country faces the same basic problems it did before 1944.

The economist and sociologist are also interested in Guatemala. Guatemala has been exposed to the benefits of foreign enterprise or capitalism for some time. The most important companies in this respect are the United Fruit Company, the International Railways of Central America and Empresa

Eléctrica, which together represent investments of well over \$100 million.<sup>8</sup>

Furthermore, since colonial times the people of Guatemala (over 90 per cent) have been closely associated with the activities of the powerful Catholic Church, which has been concerned with the welfare of all groups—landed oligarchy, Ladinos, and Indians.

There has been some progress, but authoritative reports as well as on-the-spot observation reveal much misery in Guatemala in the mid-twentieth century. In the area of public education, for example, there is much to be done. In 1883, the illiteracy rate was 88.63 per cent and, in 1950, it was still high, approximately 70 per cent—and in some Indian regions over 90 per cent.<sup>9</sup>

In the United States, the life expectancy at birth (1949–1951) for males was 68.07 years; in Guatemala it was 43.64. In the United States, chronic diseases such as cancer and heart conditions are serious problems, but in Guatemala most deaths are caused by lack of sanitation, poor nutrition and inadequate housing. In 1955, Guatemala had an infant mortality rate of 101.4 per 1,000 live births. In the United States it was 26.5.<sup>10</sup>

Obviously the concepts, viewpoints and interests of scholars, businessmen and tourists blend. But it is interesting and important to consider Guatemala as a whole, and especially the state of Jutiapa, from another point of view—its position in the world struggle between communism and democracy.

## PLAN JUTIAPA

Jutiapa is one of the 22 departments (states) of Guatemala. It is located in the southeast corner, touching El Salvador. The people are largely Ladino and this region is agriculturally productive. In this area, as elsewhere in Latin America, population is on the increase. In 11 years (1950–1961) the total jumped from 142,688 to 195,420, or a gain of 52,732. According to the census figures of 1950, the illiteracy rate in that year was 76.7 per cent in this department. Obviously Guatemala needs educational reform.

Some educational reforms were attempted

<sup>6</sup> Lewis Hanke, *Mexico and the Caribbean* (Modern Latin America, Continent in Ferment, Vol. I). Anvil, D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., New York, 1959, p. 16ff.

<sup>7</sup> The Organization of American States was formed by the Act of Bogota, 1948, and by this agreement the twenty-one republics of the Pan American Union pledged themselves to settle such problems by joint action. The O.A.S. took no effective action regarding Guatemala and the U.S. blocked an effort to refer the problem to the U.N. Arthur P. Whitaker, "The U.S. and Latin America since 1865," *Current History*, March, 1945, p. 159.

<sup>8</sup> Hubert Herring, *Latin America*. Alfred A. Knopf (1955), Chapter 29.

<sup>9</sup> Chester Lloyd Jones, *Guatemala, Past and Present*. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, Minn., 1940, p. 337; Whetten, *op. cit.*, p. 261.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, Chapter XI.

in the past, but, as the record indicates, little was accomplished. For example, legislation was enacted as early as 1875 which declared that education must be "popular, obligatory, lay and free." Obviously the government was in no position to enforce such a decree because buildings, teachers, equipment and programs were lacking.

On March 8, 1945, a national literacy law was issued which was patterned somewhat after the Mexican idea of "each one teach one." An emergency was declared and campaigns were inaugurated to wipe out illiteracy, but the results were not very successful. By 1950 illiteracy was still over 70 per cent.

Frank Traiber, who is the present technical adviser for the Literary Project under the United States Aid Mission for Guatemala, has made a study of the literacy program sponsored by the government from 1945 to 1953.<sup>11</sup> During this time over \$1 million was spent and the cost per pupil was over \$11. During the trial year that Plan Jutiapa has been in operation, the average cost has been only \$1.10 per pupil. These statistics indicate various problems present in Guatemala as well as in Latin America in general. Undoubtedly, corruption or misuse of funds is often excessive in Latin America. In other words, sufficient money was spent in the literacy program from 1945 to 1953 to get better results. Despite the idealistic view of a few who engineered the reforms after 1945, many active in government and the army were actually opposed to effective education for the masses. In 1961, a report on the illiteracy program (1945-1953) reveals the attitude of the forces which came into power after the

Arbenz regime was overthrown in the spring of 1954:

Fundamental education and the campaign against illiteracy are the best methods for the indoctrination of international communism; and for that reason, such plans are discontinued. . . .<sup>12</sup>

Another reason for the lack of early success was the inability to appreciate the attitude of the illiterates themselves. Along the road from Guatemala City to Jutiapa, the capital of the department of the same name, it was common to see girls carrying water in containers on their heads and little boys of pre-school age carrying bundles of firewood on their backs. Such practical "education" is present and necessary in Guatemala today. Only by such family cooperation can the necessities of life be acquired. In other words, the problem of education in sub-standard countries presents a vicious circle. Education is impossible because living standards are low, and standards are low because education is lacking. No wonder many a Guatemalan father looks upon schooling as merely a plan to "learn how to be lazy."

But apparently conditions are changing somewhat. Even among the exploited, illiteracy is beginning to have a bad connotation, and as a feeling of nationalism develops a demand for better schools, books, supplies and teachers is growing. Those who promote educational programs must appreciate the need for this change in the attitude or value patterns of a people. This brings us back to Plan Jutiapa.

When the plan started, over 100 teachers volunteered their services to help eradicate illiteracy in Jutiapa, which was selected as a pilot area. The number has now increased to over 500. Most of these volunteers are teachers from the regular schools or prominent individuals of towns, villages, or hamlets.

The first step in the plan was to select supervisors for 17 *municipios* (counties) in Jutiapa. Then meetings were held to give instruction in use of books, guides, and visual aids, as well as methods in general.

The Literacy Project is carried on entirely apart from the regular schools and therefore

<sup>11</sup> Most of the material on Plan Jutiapa comes from two articles published in the local Guatemalan press, from numerous conversations with Frank Traiber, who is technical adviser for Literary Project, Educational Division, U.S. Aid Mission, Guatemala, as well as on-the-spot observations in Jutiapa itself. "Plan Jutiapa" Sigue Conquistando Exitos," *Juteapan*, Jutiapa, Junio de 1962, No. 3; "Ambicioso Plan," *Prensa Libre*, Guatemala City, Enero 15 de 1962.

<sup>12</sup> Victor Manuel Valverde, *El Analfabetismo en Guatemala*. Ministerio de educación Publica y Servicio Cooperativo Interamericano de Educacion. (Primer Seminario Nacional Sobre Problemas de la Educacion Guatemalteca), Guatemala City, April 1961, p. 35.

utilizes non-school hours. It is directed primarily at adults, but children of all ages may attend. One of the teachers associated with the program made the statement that from the time of its break from Spain (1821) until 1944 (123 years), nothing had been done in Guatemala for adult education. It would appear, then, that this is a real opportunity for Guatemala, and the *Alianza para el Progreso*.

Plan Jutiapa has incorporated the idea of self-help to make the project as Guatemalan as possible. Except for Frank Traiber, the personnel is entirely Guatemalan—office force, supervisors and teachers. Strange as it may seem, the Guatemalan Office of Education has been niggardly in its official support of the program. The supervisors and most of the teachers serve as regular employees of the Guatemalan school system, but in Plan Jutiapa they are individual volunteers.

From the newspapers the program has acquired charts, ink, paper, and free publicity. As a result of, and in cooperation with, the press of Guatemala City, the Project hopes to promote the reading of newspapers. Apparently many in the interior towns have never seen a paper.

Surprisingly, the Guatemalan army has given the recent project its blessing. All books and printed material are produced by the army at cost. The army also supplies unskilled labor for jobs in the printing shop. From the army or government the program gets free shipments of material, free postage and free storage and office space. Illiteracy in the Guatemalan army is about 42 per cent, and in a barracks in Jutiapa, our visiting group enjoyed hearing one of the many colonels explain how the educational materials were used in the armed forces. It has been stated that a successful army can be created in the classroom. Apparently the procedure is being somewhat reversed in Guatemala, at least for a time, and the colonel is producing the good citizen.

Every effort is being made to stress the

<sup>13</sup> Frank Traiber told the author that a Mrs. Alice Beardsley of San Francisco, California, had started a collection of used eyeglass frames to be used in Guatemala as a "bank" for those in need.

utility of education in addition to mere reading and writing. The day our group visited several of the school sites in Jutiapa, useful projects were very much in evidence. On the walls about the benches and crates serving as desks and chairs one noticed maps, charts and pictures dealing with health, nutrition, sanitation, machinery and crops. There were also school gardens.

In addition to a graded series of primers, six in all, for reading and writing, the program also supplies little booklets from the popular library of the Pan American Union. A few rather advanced ones (for illiterates) deal with cultural topics such as *Algunas Aventuras de Don Quijote* (Some Adventures of Don Quixote) and José Martí (hero of Cuba). But most have such simple yet important titles as: *La Viruela* (smallpox), *¡Cuidado con la Leche!* (Be careful with milk), *Credito Agricola* (Agricultural Credit), and *Agua Pura* (pure water).

On the afternoon of July 14, 1962, our party visited six school sites. Conditions ranged from good to extremely poor. Pupils ranging in age from six to sixty-five came to learn to read and write. In some cases there were no adequate desks, few pencils, and when the sun went down there was no light except a candle—one school had no candle. Some school sites were apparently more primitive or crude than those we saw.

Obviously the whole health area is related to education. Many cannot learn to read and write because of poor eyesight and lack of glasses. The possibilities of an educational program can be fruitful indeed.<sup>13</sup>

Viewing conditions and events in Guatemala, several things should be clear. The

(Continued on page 118)

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C. A. Hauberg held a Social Science Research Council Grant in the 1950's to investigate the economic and social history of Panama. He was a visiting professor at the University of Panama "summer session," 1954. He has published articles in the fields of history, the social sciences and education, and has served as a consultant in these fields.

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## CURRENT DOCUMENTS

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# The O.A.S. Resolution on Cuba

*On October 23, 1962, the Council of the Organization of American States approved the United States "quarantine" of Cuba, because of the threat to the Western Hemisphere. The vote was 19 to 0, with one abstention (Uruguay).<sup>1</sup>*

### WHEREAS,

The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947 (Rio Treaty) recognizes the obligation of the American Republics to "provide for effective reciprocal assistance to meet armed attacks against any American state and in order to deal with threats of aggression against any of them."

Article 6 of the said Treaty states:

"If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American State should be affected by an aggression which is not an armed attack or by an extra-continental or intra-continental conflict, or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America, the Organ of Consultation shall meet immediately in order to agree on the measures which must be taken in case of aggression to assist the victim of the aggression or, in any case, the measures which should be taken for the common defense and for the maintenance of the peace and security of the Continent."

The Eighth Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics in Punta del Este in January, 1962, agreed in Resolution II "To urge the member states to take those steps that they may consider appropriate for their individual and collective self-defense, and to cooperate, as may be necessary or desirable, to strengthen their

capacity to counteract threats or acts of aggression, subversion, or other dangers to peace and security resulting from the continued intervention in this hemisphere of Sino-Soviet powers, in accordance with the obligations established in treaties and agreements such as the Charter of the Organization of American States and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance";

The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics meeting informally in Washington, October 2 and 3, 1962, reasserted "the firm intention of the Governments represented and of the peoples of the American Republics to conduct themselves in accordance with the principles of the regional system, staunchly sustaining and consolidating the principles of the Charter of the Organization of American States, and affirmed the will to strengthen the security of the Hemisphere against all aggression from within or outside the Hemisphere and against all developments or situations capable of threatening the peace and security of the Hemisphere through the application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of Rio de Janeiro. It was the view of the Ministers that the existing organizations and bodies of the inter-American system should intensify the carrying out of their respective duties with special and urgent attention to the situation created by the communist regime in Cuba and that they should stand in readiness to consider the matter promptly if the situation

*(Continued on page 119)*

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<sup>1</sup> The following day, after receiving instructions from his government, the Uruguayan delegate also voted for the resolution.

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## BOOK REVIEWS

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### ON LATIN AMERICA

**CASTRO'S REVOLUTION: MYTHS AND REALITIES.** By THEODORE DRAPER. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962. 221 pages, \$4.50.)

This valuable analysis of "the nature and direction of Castro's regime" is an outgrowth of three essays previously published by *Encounter*. Through careful scrutiny of Castro's speeches and actions Draper charts the twists and turns of the revolution and concludes that "Castro—as much demagogue as leader, as much adventurer as revolutionary, as much anarchist as Communist or anything else—was suddenly and unexpectedly catapulted into power without a real party, a real army, or a real program. He had never been identified in the struggle for power with any original economic or political ideas, and had differed from Batista's other enemies chiefly in his faith in armed struggle. His political gifts were of a demagogic, not a creative, order. The Communists were able to fill this vacuum in him, once they had made up their minds that they could win power, not against him, but only through him. . . .

With regard to the effect of United States policies on Cuban events Draper believes "The myth that American policy in 1959 pushed Castro into the arms of Soviet Russia and the Communists makes American policy far more active and positive than it actually was."

**LATIN AMERICA—DIPLOMACY AND REALITY.** By ADOLF A. BERLE. (New York: Harper & Row, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1962. 144 pages and index, \$2.95.)

This specialist analyzes the forces work-

ing for change in Latin America and the involvement of the United States in the possible political and social upheaval. He declares that if a government in Latin America threatens "the safety of the United States," it should not be tolerated. However, if a government, dedicated to a differing social system, is established in Latin America, the United States must learn to live with it provided it meets Berle's three qualifications: "(1) that it does not make itself a danger to the United States, (2) that it does not violate at least minimal standards of human rights, and (3) that it does not undertake aggression against its neighbors. . . ." If a newly created government meets the three criteria, it "need not be an unwelcome member of the American family of nations."

Berle offers a candid and realistic appraisal of the power politics involving Latin America.

**THE CUBAN INVASION: THE CHRONICLE OF A DISASTER.** By KARL E. MEYER AND TAD SZULC. (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1962. 156 pages and index, \$3.95.)

Two journalists, Karl Meyer of the editorial staff of *The Washington Post* and Tad Szulc of the Washington Bureau of *The New York Times*, chronicle the events that led to the disaster of the Cuban invasion. They conclude that the invasion was doomed by the limitations imposed on the military plans in the mistaken belief that it would be possible to disguise American complicity in the project. But primarily, the invasion was a failure because the C.I.A. operation "was like a car decked out with flashy accessories . . . but lacking a motor. The motor could not be installed by outside mechanics—the vi-



tal missing part was the participation of the Cuban people in whose name the invasion was fought."

Observing that United States' "blunders abetted Castro's communization of Cuba," the authors reject "the argument that the United States drove Castro into Khrushchev's arms. Getting the 'Maximum Leader' to embrace the Russians was like bribing Don Juan to have a date with Venus."

**THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS: PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES.** EDITED BY JOHN C. DREIER. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962. 241 pages and index, \$3.95.)

Five lectures of the Alliance for Progress sponsored by the School of Advanced International Studies of The Johns Hopkins University in the spring of 1962 are collected in this book. The distinguished lecturers and their subjects are: Milton S. Eisenhower: *The Alliance for Progress: Historic Roots*; Raúl Prebush: *Economic Aspects of the Alliance*; José Figueres: *The Alliance and Political Goals*; Teodoro Moscoso: *Social Change and the Alliance*; and Dean Rusk: *The Alliance in the Context of World Affairs*.

**A GUIDE TO CURRENT LATIN AMERICAN PERIODICALS, HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES.** BY IRENE ZIMMERMAN. (Gainesville, Florida: Kallman Publishing Co., 1961. 357 pages, appendix, index, \$7.50, softbound edition.)

This is an excellent guide to Latin American periodicals in the humanities and social science fields. The periodicals are listed both geographically, under the country of origin, and by subject. There is a chronological listing from 1831 to 1960. The author has also included a "casualty list" of 117 periodicals which have recently become defunct. The listings are helpfully annotated.

—T.H.B.

## HISTORY AND POLITICS

**A HISTORY OF SOVIET AIR POWER.** BY ROBERT A. KILMARX. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962. 359 pages, bibliography and index, \$7.50.)

In recent years, public attention has centered increasingly on the capacity of the Soviet air force to deliver a first and second strike nuclear attack, and in its ability to wage non-nuclear, brush-fire wars. Although the C.I.A. and our military establishment are aware of the steady and impressive expansion and development of the Soviet air force since 1945, little has been available for the interested, lay audience.

Kilmarx has written a readable, well-documented, informative account of the growth of military aviation in Russia from World War I to the present level of intercontinental ballistic missiles and space satellites. The material is organized systematically and clearly presented. Rich in detail and set against the background of changing Soviet foreign policy the book treats all significant aspects of Soviet aviation, including basic research, development, production, and operational experiences.

For specialists and military analysts, this book will provide a mine of valuable information; for the general reader, aviation enthusiast, and student, it offers a comprehensive survey of a vital aspect of military affairs.

—A.Z.R.

**THE JUDICIAL PROCESS.** BY HENRY J. ABRAHAM. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962. 381 pages, selected bibliography and index, \$2.25.)

This book is a much expanded and thoroughly revised sequel to Abraham's *Courts and Judges: An Introduction to the Judicial Process*, published in 1959. In his preface, Abraham states that the book is a "selective comparative introduction to the judicial process." His purpose is "to analyze and evaluate the main institutions and considerations affecting the administration of justice under law." This he ac-

compleishes well by a clear and concise survey of the judicial process in the United States as compared with England and Wales, France, and the Soviet Union. Though the major focus is on the American system, the other countries are discussed sufficiently to make a valuable comparative study.

Most important, the book is extremely well written and sensibly organized. Four extensive, fully documented bibliographies are of particular value.

ROCCO J. TRESOLINI  
Lehigh University

**CURRENT SOVIET POLICIES IV: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD OF THE 22ND CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION.** EDITED BY CHARLOTTE SAIKOWSKI AND LEO GRULIOW. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962. 248 pages and index, \$8.50.)

Since the twenty-second Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in October, 1961, there has been a spate of publications presenting the new Party Program and key speeches of Soviet leaders. This documentary record, published under the auspices of *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, is the most comprehensive now available in the English language. It contains the new Party Program and new Party statutes, the key speeches and excerpts from the discussion speeches of various Party officials. The resolutions passed by the Congress are included and there is a valuable "Who's Who of the Central Committee" that has been compiled by Mark Neuwend.

—A.Z.R.

**RUSSIA TSARIST AND COMMUNIST.** BY ANATOLE G. MAZOUR. (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1962. 995 pages, selected readings, chronology, and index, \$12.00.)

Professor Mazour has written a massive, readable, richly informative history of Rus-

sia. The book is a revision and expansion of an earlier study, *Russia Past and Present*. "The new work includes additional material, revisions, and corrections and brings up to date the narrative. The original book was based on the principle of topical order; the present book has discarded that order in favor of the traditional chronological narrative."

The narrative is interesting and well-organized; it is written with clarity and commendable restraint. It will certainly find a welcome and widely-honored place among the leading texts in the field. There is an excellent bibliography and chronology which will prove most useful to advanced students.

—A.Z.R.

**SYSTEMATIC POLITICS: ELEMENTA POLITICA ET SOCIOLOGICA.** BY GEORGE E. GORDON CATLIN. (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1962. 434 pages and index, \$7.50.)

For several decades, Professor Catlin has been one of the prime movers for a "scientific" approach to the study of politics. Bringing his vast knowledge and experience to bear, he draws upon other social scientists to analyze the nature of politics and the study of power. In addition, he devotes considerable attention to such vital issues as "the methodological identity of Political Science and Sociology, the separation in political theory between Political Science and Political Philosophy, the stress upon quantitative measurement, the functional approach, equilibrium theory and the theory of the political market, the importance of recurrent patterns, the concern for power expressed through pressure groups, and so forth."

There is presented a systematic theory "of the relation of freedom and authority, from which any notion of schematic 'laws' in politics must stem." The social scientist will find in this new work by Professor Catlin a wide range of intellectually stimulating topics.

—A.Z.R.

(Continued on page 119)

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## COLD WAR IN LATIN AMERICA

*Continued from page 72*

the General Assembly usually agreed with the United States' stand on European affairs but were somewhat less in agreement on the Korean War. In general, Mexico and Guatemala (before and after the revolution of 1954) have voted most frequently against the United States' position. Peru, Brazil, and Uruguay have generally sided with the United States on major issues.

Latin Americans have disagreed sharply with each other in the United Nations on the Palestine question, relations with Spain (Mexico, Uruguay, and Guatemala were irreconcilably hostile towards Franco), membership for Communist China, specific issues of human rights, and independence for European colonies in Africa. On occasion, several Latin American nations have voted in somewhat the same way on similar questions: Mexico, Guatemala, and Haiti as liberals; the Dominican Republic, Peru, Nicaragua, and Brazil as conservatives. But these "groups" differed on specific issues and did not constitute conscious blocs.<sup>23</sup>

Latin Americans often have called for international administration of foreign aid and advocated lower barriers on trade, stable prices for basic commodities, and multilateral trade agreements. However, their governments collectively have done little to achieve these ends.

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<sup>23</sup> Cornelius, William G., "The 'Latin-American Bloc' in the United Nations," *Journal of Inter-American Studies* (September, 1961), pp. 419-435. Cornelius, who does not use the terms "liberal" and "conservative," points out that revolutions in Bolivia and Venezuela did not change the voting pattern of those countries (to 1955). The United States tentatively has supported the recent Latin American proposal for a de-nuclearized South America.

<sup>24</sup> For background on economic integration, see National Planning Association, *United States-Latin American Relations: Policies Affecting Their Economic Relations*, Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 48998, January 31, 1960. The volumes of the *Hispanic American Report* are the most convenient source of information on the progress of L.A.F.T.A. and Latin America's relations with the Common Market.

Since about 1957, the United States has supported economic integration for Latin America.<sup>24</sup> The records of recent Latin American economic conferences are filled with statements about the alarming possibility of being excluded from European markets and the advantages of forming a Latin American common market. José A. Mora of the O.A.S. has initiated contacts with the E.E.C. But L.A.F.T.A.'s frustrating lack of agreement on tariffs, quotas, and other commercial questions, during the three-month sessions held in Mexico City in the autumn of 1962, suggests that comprehensive economic cooperation lies far in the future. It can only be hoped that more enlightened statesmen, working with officials of the O.A.S. and the Alliance for Progress, will gradually be able to overcome the influence of narrow interests.

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## LATIN AMERICA AND COMMUNIST BLOC

*Continued from page 77*

other. This may completely split the Latin American Communists from the Jacobin Left. It seems likely that the orthodox Communist parties will support the Soviet party, while the Jacobin Leftists will become the Chinese Communists of the Western Hemisphere.

The orthodox Communist parties in Latin America have a more or less recognized position in their nations' political spectrum. They have influence in the labor movement, have numerous publications, and sizeable paid staffs. A number have representatives in congresses and other legislative bodies. Furthermore, their leadership tends to consist of late middle-aged or old men. Under these circumstances, the more moderate and long-range perspective of the Soviet Communists will tend to be more attractive to the Latin American orthodox Communists than will the more drastic methods favored by the Chinese.

In contrast, the Jacobin Leftists are generally young, they have no history, they have few institutions, they have little representation in legislatures. Therefore, they will be much

more willing than the orthodox Communists to go to the hills and mount a guerrilla war, on the Chinese or Cuban models, as the Chinese Communists are urging them to do.

In spite of the spectacular nature of Cuba's relations with the Communist nations, Latin America as a whole still has relatively tenuous connections with the Communist bloc. Only a few Latin American nations have diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, although a larger number recognize one or more of the East European countries. Only Cuba has relations with Communist China.

In recent years all the Communist nations have attempted to intensify informal contact with the Latin American countries, through "political tourism," extensive written propaganda and other methods. It is difficult to measure the net impact of all of this activity. Certainly, it has so far resulted in only limited formal diplomatic relations between the Communist bloc and Latin America.

In commercial terms only Cuba is deeply committed to the Communist nations. The result for Cuba has not been such as to encourage other Latin American countries to hasten to follow the Cuban example.

Finally, on the party-to-party level, an important new element has appeared during the last three years, with the advent of the Castro regime. This has been the emergence of Jacobin Left parties and groups in various Latin American countries, all of which have seen Fidel Castro as their source of inspiration and their principal spokesman. The advent of the Jacobin Left has for the time being strengthened the Communist parties in Latin America, and hence the political influence of the Soviet Union. However, the Jacobin Left promises in the future to cause considerable difficulties for those in the area who are unconditional supporters of the Communist countries.

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## CASTROISM

*Continued from page 83*

benefits such as rapidly expanding educational opportunity, a sports program, and mass cultural programs. Even at this late

date, Castro is able to rely upon his charismatic leadership to urge on his people.

Castro's staying-power seems to have remained relatively great, although prediction of his tenure is now especially risky because of the appearance of unfavorable factors in the last year. The future depends not only on the international situation but also on changes in the nature of the Castro revolution. The nearness of Cuba to the United States and other free societies serves as a reminder that there is another way of life. The adoption by the United States of a more vigorous anti-Castro policy would encourage the anti-Castroites in Cuba. Simultaneously, however, it would strengthen the faith and determination of Castro's supporters. The amorphous majority in the middle is likely to accept whoever seizes or holds power.

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## ARGENTINA

*Continued from page 88*

Cuba at the Punta del Este meeting of American foreign ministers in January, 1962. Shortly after that meeting, counter-pressure from the more international-minded and anti-Communist armed forces compelled Frondizi to sever diplomatic relations with Cuba. All the military factions that have ruled since his overthrow have followed the same line; in the October, 1962, crisis over Soviet missiles in Cuba, Argentina offered warships to support the blockade of that island.

It remains to be seen whether the government that is to be chosen in 1963 will continue to be anti-Communist. What course it will follow with regard to the Latin American Free Trade Association, which Frondizi helped to set up, and other important international problems is not yet determined. It is as true of Argentina as it is of other countries that domestic politics does *not* stop at the water's edge.

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## MEXICO

*Continued from page 94*

back. The strenuous efforts to explain her vote confirm this view.

Prior to the gathering at Punta del Este, Mexico made sure that her December misfortune would not be repeated. Foreign Minister Tello visited his Brazilian counterpart and the two issued a joint declaration of principles on the eve of the foreign ministers' meeting. At Punta del Este, Mexico voted affirmatively that the principles of communism were incompatible with the principles of the inter-American system. However, she joined five other nations abstaining on the critical issue of the expulsion of Cuba from the Organization of American States. Once again Mexico's grounds were juridical.

Mexico's advocacy of self-determination and non-intervention in the case of Cuba must be placed in perspective by recognizing the apparent dedication of Mexico's leaders to social progress by legal means with the maintenance of human dignity and freedom. It is also obvious that friendly relations with the United States must be an essential ingredient of Mexico's policy. The present administration will continue to strive for unity and the evolutionary path at home, but is has no intention of permitting extremist elements to disturb order or to vault to power on the Castro issue.

The United States needs to understand and appreciate Mexico's foreign policy. Her exercise of independence was necessary, inevitable and desirable. Her consistent adherence to principles of international conduct merits admiration. As in the past, relations with Mexico will have far-reaching repercussions throughout the hemisphere; Mexico may become a shining example of the accomplishments of the Alliance for Progress.

On many issues, minor and major, it can no longer be assumed that Mexico will follow the lead of the United States. On critical, life or death matters, on the bases of tradition, common ideals and similar goals as well as because of objective circumstances which she cannot control, Mexico will undoubtedly be found siding with the United States.<sup>5</sup> On less

vital matters, it can only be hoped that the logic and justice of the United States position will merit Mexican support.

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## PERU

*Continued from page 99*

omnipresent for the tastes of nationalists; North Americans are in mining, banking, trade, industry—the total United States direct investment in Peru stands at \$446 million. No matter how truly foreign investment may serve the national economy, its presence is always irritating.

There is also anger against the United States for its imposition of quotas upon the purchase of zinc and lead, two of Peru's chief products. Much of the suspicion of the United States is whipped up by the hard core of Communists, not numerous but always noisy, and these are abetted by the volunteer disciples of Fidel Castro who are present in Peru as they are in all of Latin America. But most literate Peruvians seem convinced that their national destiny must develop in concord with the United States. Even the Apristas contribute to this general conviction. And the leaders of the well-educated and wealthy community are, on the whole, persuaded that the safety and prosperity of Peru will have a better chance within the framework of inter-American solidarity.

It would be idle to predict the path Peru will take in the current see-saw between the Communist and the non-Communist worlds. There are abundant grounds for social upheaval in Peru, and a revolution in the Cuban style is not impossible. Such a revolution will not come, however, so long as the military dominate, nor would it come in the unlikely event that the Apristas should win power. But observers of Peruvian realities are only too aware that out of the bitter misery of the great majority of the people there might arise a demagogue who would take Peru down the bloody course of the Mexico of yesterday or the Cuba of today. It would be unwise to bet on such matters, so we will wait and see. Meanwhile, foreign owners of Peruvian mines might well pray.

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<sup>5</sup> Mexico's affirmative vote endorsing United States naval quarantine of Castro's Cuba in relation to the construction of missile sites there would seem to be confirmation of the view expressed above.



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## BRAZIL

*Continued from page 105*

the opinion of the Brazilian government, preservation of the inter-American system and peace in the hemisphere are far more important than the political persuasion of the Castro regime. According to this interpretation any weakening of the principles of non-intervention and self-determination of peoples to deal with the Cuban problem jeopardizes the peace and undermines the juridical bases of the inter-American system itself. Until the crisis over the missile base, this opinion was fully shared by Mexico, Chile, and Bolivia, which with Brazil account for well over half the population of Latin America.

Throughout the year, Brazil was consistent in supporting joint measures to limit the arms race in the Western Hemisphere, thus reducing the possibility of open conflict between American states. With the establishment of the Cuban quarantine, the Brazilian government was equally firm in insisting on the creation of an effective inspection system under United Nations auspices to guarantee that no nuclear weapons remained on the island. Perhaps the most constructive suggestion for preventing a repetition of the Soviet arms build-up in Cuba was the Brazilian proposal to the United Nations in late October, 1962, that all of Latin America be regarded as a denuclearized zone. This proposal was hailed by the United States, the Soviet Union, and the non-aligned bloc as a significant contribution to the cause of world peace. All in all, under the Goulart regime Brazil has demonstrated that its broad foreign policy objectives are compatible with those of the United States. Yet there are irritating differences in detail, and it remains abundantly clear that Brazil's support on specific issues cannot be taken for granted.

During the months of parliamentary government, the furor over chronic political indecision and continued rampant inflation served to obscure the fact that Brazil preserved its open political system and basically free economy. Despite strong pressures from

the right and the left, the extremes of military coup d'état and social revolution were averted. Under the circumstances, this was no mean achievement. There is still a broad consensus that a constitutional solution must be found that will permit social justice without jeopardizing either continued rapid economic progress or political stability.

In itself, return to the presidential system will not guarantee success. But it is fervently hoped by all friends of Brazil that, after settling the immediate problem of the form of government, the political leaders will turn their full attention to their basic economic problem. Monetary inflation will have to be brought under control if the country is to cope successfully with the more spectacular inflation of popular aspirations for a better life. Brazil will continue to need the understanding and assistance of the United States.

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## GUATEMALA

*Continued from page 110*

sending of guns and money is apparently the wrong kind of help, especially if the guns are used to suppress democratic tendencies and money is wasted or goes to the already affluent few.

In this peripatetic world of philosopher kings, presidents, prime ministers and ordinary legislatures, the parochial concepts that used to dominate from Ivory Tower to College Hill are no longer adequate. We need "a human standard of achievement for all people of all nations." Lip service and intellectual ritual are insufficient today; they must be accompanied by a change in thinking and action. Moreover, as education in such places as Burma, India, Africa and Jutiapa becomes democratized our world neighbors acquire ideas relative to communism, democracy, free enterprise and general welfare. If the goal of the leading countries of the West is mutual respect, understanding and peace, then there must be a *sharing* of our democratic and spiritual concepts, without dictation or recrimination.

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## RESOLUTION ON CUBA

*Continued from page 111*

requires measures beyond those already authorized."

The same meeting "recalled that the Soviet Union's intervention in Cuba threatens the unity of the Americas and its democratic institutions, and that this intervention has special characteristics which, pursuant to paragraph 3 of Resolution II of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, call for the adoption of special measures, both individual and collective";

Incontrovertible evidence has appeared that the Government of Cuba, despite repeated warnings, has secretly endangered the peace of the Continent by permitting the Sino-Soviet powers to have intermediate and middle-range missiles on its territory capable of carrying nuclear warheads;

### THE COUNCIL OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, MEETING AS THE PROVISIONAL ORGAN OF CONSULTATION, RESOLVES:

1. To call for the immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and other weapons with any offensive capability;
2. To recommend that the member states, in accordance with Article 6 and 8 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, take all measures, individually and collectively, including the use of armed force, which they may deem necessary to ensure that the Government of Cuba cannot continue to receive from the Sino-Soviet powers military material and related supplies which may threaten the peace and security of the Continent and to prevent the missiles in Cuba with offensive capability from ever becoming an active threat to the peace and security of the Continent;
3. To inform the Security Council of the United Nations of this resolution in accordance with Article 54 of the Charter of the United Nations and to express the hope that the Security Council will, in accordance with

the draft resolution introduced by the United States, dispatch United Nations observers to Cuba at the earliest moment;

4. To continue to serve provisionally as Organ of Consultation and to request the Member States to keep the Organ of Consultation duly informed of measures taken by them in accordance with paragraph two of this resolution.

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## BOOKS

*Continued from page 114*

**NATIONS IN ALLIANCE. THE LIMITS OF INTERDEPENDENCE.** BY GEORGE LISKA. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962. 291 pages, and index, \$6.00.)

An encouraging development in the fields of diplomacy and history is the attempt to find new concepts and principles, beyond the balance of power principle, to explain the relationships which exist among nations in alliance. Dividing his study into two parts, Liska first takes up the motivational factors behind the formation of alignments, the cohesive forces which keep them intact, and the efficacy of alliances in reducing conflicts. The second part of the book is an analysis of basic trends and policies.

The author's general conception is intriguing, suggestive and promising; but, unfortunately, his plan is not realized in the most effective way. Liska does not clearly set forth his criteria; he does not sufficiently support many of his basic generalizations with historical evidence; and he encumbers his style with a nomenclature which obscures his meaning.

In spite of these shortcomings, the book contains some valuable insights. Liska has opened new avenues of thought and has made a contribution to an exceedingly difficult and complex topic, a topic which many diplomats and historians still are content to treat in terms of the concept of the balance of power.

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University of California at Los Angeles

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# THE MONTH IN REVIEW

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*A CURRENT HISTORY Chronology covering the most important events of December, 1962, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.*

## INTERNATIONAL

### Berlin

Dec. 27—In West Berlin, a bomb is exploded along the Berlin wall, leaving a 20-foot hole.

### Disarmament

Dec. 3—The U.S.S.R. refuses neutralist proposals for an interim arrangement to ban underground nuclear tests.

Dec. 10—The U.S.S.R. offers to allow international teams to inspect 2 or 3 robot seismic detection stations on its territory under a test ban treaty.

Dec. 11—Britain and the U.S. refuse the Russian offer to substitute robots for on-site inspection.

Dec. 13—The Soviet Union says that negotiation of a test ban treaty cannot succeed if the U.S. and Britain insist on on-site inspection to prevent clandestine underground tests.

Dec. 18—Britain, the Soviet Union and the U.S. give up their effort to reach agreement on a nuclear test ban by January 1, 1963.

Dec. 20—The 17-nation disarmament conference recesses for Christmas without reaching any agreement.

### East Europe

Dec. 21—The seven-nation Council of Mutual Economic Aid (COMECON) reveals plans to establish an Eastern European development bank and an international payments system; the decision was made at the 17th plenary meeting in Bucharest.

### European Economic Community (Common Market)

Dec. 5—Common Market ministers refuse to alter their policy on the integration of Brit-

ish agriculture into the Common Market.

Dec. 10—Britain and Common Market nations begin to discuss the subject of British agriculture; a compromise procedure for further discussion is adopted. (See also *France*.)

### International Court Of Justice

Dec. 21—The International Court of Justice rules that it has jurisdiction on the Ethiopian-Liberian claim that the Union of South Africa is violating the U.N. Charter by practicing apartheid in the mandate territory of South West Africa.

### United Nations

(See also *Congo*)

Dec. 5—The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. agree to cooperate in 3 peaceful uses of outer space: satellite weather observations, studies of the magnetic field of the earth and worldwide communication via satellites.

Portugal attacks the U.N. for not criticizing the "warlike and subversive" preparations of the Africans against Portugal.

Dec. 14—The General Assembly condemns Portugal for her African policies; the vote is 82 to 7, with 13 abstentions. The U.S., Britain, France, Belgium, Spain, South Africa and Portugal vote against the condemning resolution.

Dec. 16—A Soviet effort to call for removal of all foreign troops from Korea is defeated in the General Assembly's Political Committee.

Dec. 20—The U.S. pledges \$24.7 million to aid Palestinian refugees but asks for a change of emphasis from relief to retraining for employment.

The General Assembly adjourns.

## ALGERIA

Dec. 1—In the second day of talks in France, Algerian Foreign Minister Mohammed Khemisti tells of the need for French personnel to help with the administrative and public services.

Dec. 3—Algerian police arrest European and Muslim foes of Premier Ben Bella's government. Ben Bella declares that the arrests (the number undisclosed) are part of the "purification drive."

Dec. 4—In a message to the National Assembly, Ben Bella warns that Algeria faces serious economic difficulties, which must be met by an austerity program and by foreign aid.

Khemisti leaves Paris for home.

The Soviet Union issues a statement urging the Algerian government to repeal its ban on the Communist party of Algeria, imposed November 29.

Dec. 17—Ben Bella officiates at the opening ceremonies of the University of Algiers, which reopens for the first time since independence in July.

## ARGENTINA

Dec. 4—Economics Minister Alvaro C. Alsogaray resigns. The military charged him with failing to end the recession. Thirteen undersecretaries and economic leaders also resign.

Dec. 6—It is reported that President José María Guido will resign unless warring military factions agree to support his plan for general elections in June, 1963.

Dec. 11—Guido fires 2 leading Air Force commanders. Commander-in-Chief Antonio Alsina is replaced by Brigadier Carlos Conrado Armanini. Brigadier Gilberto Hidalgo Oliva, Alsina's top aid, is also fired. Alsina flies to Cordoba in an attempt to rally a revolt at the Cordoba air force garrison and academy. It is reported that the Cordoba base is remaining loyal to the new commander.

## BRAZIL

Dec. 17—U.S. Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy meets with President Joao Goulart

in Brazil. They discuss United States concern over Brazil's financial and political problems. Kennedy departs afterwards.

Dec. 30—The Brazilian government announces that the Cabinet has approved a national development plan. The plan outlines a 7 per cent annual increase in the gross national product, and will attempt to decrease inflation without halting economic growth.

## BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

### Great Britain

Dec. 5—For the fifth time in 100 years, the House of Commons upholds the censorship authority of the Lord Chamberlain, who licenses theatrical productions in Britain.

Dec. 7—Prime Minister Harold Macmillan reproves Dean Acheson, former U.S. Secretary of State, for his comments that Britain's "attempt to play a separate power role" was "about to be played out." (See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*.)

Dec. 17—The Labor party asks the Government to act to alleviate what it terms "the most serious unemployment situation since the war."

A joint committee of Parliament suggests that a hereditary member of Lords be authorized by legislation to give up his peerage to become a member of Commons.

Dec. 18—The Government refuses to authorize a second commercial television network. It says it intends to supervise the existing commercial network more closely.

Dec. 20—The Labor ministry announces that more than 566,196 are unemployed; the nation's unemployment rate is 2.5 per cent, an increase of 40 per cent over 1961.

Dec. 23—Macmillan reveals that Britain plans to build 10-12 Polaris missile submarines costing \$100 million each. The Prime Minister returns to London after his conference with President Kennedy in Nassau. (See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*.)

### India

(See also *Pakistan, Dec. 26-27*)

Dec. 1—Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru

turns down Red China's suggestions for a cease-fire and border negotiations.

The Defense Ministry says Chinese forces will begin to withdraw as planned along the entire disputed frontier.

Dec. 6—The Government says its consulates in China are being closed; it has ordered the Chinese to close their consulates in India. (See also *China*.)

Dec. 9—The Chinese refuse to accept India's conditions for a border settlement.

Dec. 10—Six nonaligned nations meet in Colombo to discuss easing of the Indian-Chinese crisis. They emphasize nonalignment. Ceylon, Burma, Cambodia, Ghana, Indonesia and the U.A.R. are represented.

Nehru offers to submit the Indian-Chinese border dispute to the International Court of Justice in the Hague if the Chinese withdraw to the line they held on September 8.

Dec. 14—An Indian Foreign Ministry spokesman says there has been a "substantial withdrawal" of Chinese troops from the disputed frontier area.

Dec. 27—Indian-Pakistani talks open.

Dec. 29—Further discussions of the Indian-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir will be held in New Delhi on January 16.

## Pakistan

Dec. 2—A political mass meeting of some 10,000 ends in a riot over U.S. policies.

Dec. 26—Pakistan reveals "complete border agreement in principle" with China, on the eve of Indian-Pakistani talks on Kashmir.

Dec. 27—Indian-Pakistani talks on the Kashmir dispute begin.

## Tanganyika

Dec. 9—Tanganyika becomes a republic within the British Commonwealth. Julius Nyerere becomes president.

## BRITISH EMPIRE

### Brunei

(See *Malaysia*)

## Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland

Dec. 15—Sir Edgar Whitehead and his United Federal party are defeated in elections in Southern Rhodesia; the conservative and racist Rhodesian Front wins 35 seats in the 65-seat legislature. The United Federal party holds 28; 1 seat is independent and one is still undecided.

Dec. 18—Winston F. Field and the Rhodesian Front takes office as South Rhodesian prime minister with a policy of strict racial segregation.

Dec. 19—R. A. Butler tells Commons that the British government has in principle accepted the secession of Nyasaland from the Federation.

Federal Prime Minister Roy Welensky attacks the British decision to let Nyasaland secede.

## Malaysia

(See also *Philippines*)

Dec. 10—Duncan Sandys, Commonwealth Relations and Colonial Secretary, tells Parliament that the rebellion that began on December 8 in Brunei on the island of Borneo is being suppressed.

Dec. 20—An Intergovernmental Committee of representatives of Malaya, Britain and the crown colonies of North Borneo and Sarawak work out details of the colonies' accession to the new state, Malaysia.

Dec. 22—Lord Lansdowne, the Minister of State for Colonial Affairs, reports in London that the Federation of Malaysia is expected to come into existence by August, 1963, despite the Brunei rebellion.

## CHILE

Dec. 11—U.S. President Kennedy welcomes President Jorge Alessandri to Washington on a formal state visit.

## CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (Communist)

(See also *British Commonwealth, Pakistan*)

Dec. 25—It is reported that the Premier of Outer Mongolia, Umjagin Tsendenbal, arrived in Peking yesterday to sign a bound-



ary treaty with Communist China.

Dec. 26—Communist China and Outer Mongolia sign a border treaty.

Communist Chinese Premier Chou En-lai declares that the tension along the Chinese-Indian border has been reduced since Chinese troops have withdrawn.

## CONGO, REPUBLIC OF THE (Leopoldville)

Dec. 10—In a note to President Moïse Tshombe of Katanga province, Chief of the U.N. Congo operation Robert K. A. Gardiner warns that the U.N. is prepared to use all means short of war to end Katanga's secession.

Dec. 12—Belgian Foreign Minister Paul Henri Spaak declares that Belgium has sent a representative to try to persuade Tshombe to cooperate with Premier Cyrille Adoula.

Dec. 13—Reliable sources declare that U.N. Secretary General U Thant has asked Britain, Portugal and South Africa to prohibit copper and cobalt shipments from passing through their countries.

Dec. 18—The U.S. Department of State announces that President Kennedy has ordered an 8-man U.S. mission to visit the Congo to study the problem of restoring order.

Dec. 19—U Thant tells U.S. Lieutenant General Louis Truman the military needs required by the U.N. Congo forces. Yesterday, President Kennedy agreed to furnish them.

Dec. 21—The House of Deputies, by a standing vote of acclamation, orders the government to release former Vice-Premier Antoine Gizenga, who has been held since January, 1962.

The 8-man mission from the U.S. arrives in Leopoldville to investigate U.N. military requirements. Opposition delegates in the House of Deputies, led by Gizenga's Solidarity party, voice their protest against the U.S. mission.

Dec. 26—The U.S. military mission to the Congo leaves for the U.S.

Dec. 28—The U.N. announces that its troops have seized the headquarters of the Katangese gendarmes just outside Elisabethville (capital of secessionist Katanga Province). Robert K. A. Gardiner states that U.N. commanders in Elisabethville have been ordered to remove all 20 roadblocks. Gardiner states that the order to remove the barriers was issued only after the gendarmes refused to obey President Tshombe's order last night to cease-fire.

Dec. 29—U.N. jet planes attack Katanga's principal air base at Kolwezi. U.N. troops capture key points in Elisabethville.

It is reported that late yesterday Tshombe fled from the presidential palace in Elisabethville.

The U.N. states that its forces now are in control of all Elisabethville. It is reported that although Tshombe verbally agreed to a cease-fire yesterday, he refused to sign such an agreement.

In a communiqué relayed by a Katangese spokesman, Tshombe warns the U.N. that if fighting does not end within 24 hours, he will initiate a scorched earth policy.

Dec. 30—It is reported that Tshombe is in Salisbury in Southern Rhodesia.

The U.N. continues its successful advance in Katanga Province. Gardiner declares that the U.N. forces will not stop until secession ends in Katanga.

Dec. 31—U Thant orders U.N. forces to halt their offensive against Katanga Province.

## CUBA

(See also *U.S. Foreign Policy*.)

Dec. 5—The government announces that privately owned retail and wholesale enterprises, dealing with clothing, shoes and hardware, are being nationalized.

Dec. 23—The airlift from Cuba to Miami of 1,113 Cuban prisoners captured in the Bay of Pigs invasion begins. Their ransom of some \$62 million in food and medicine is being paid to Cuban Premier Fidel Castro. Some 425 prisoners are taken to Miami.

Dec. 25—Major Ernesto (Che) Guevara, top

economic leader, speaks over the Havana radio, warning Cubans that the 1963 sugar crop will be very small. He blames the government and the people for the poor economic output and bleak prospects.

### CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Dec. 4—The Czech Communist party convenes its 12th congress.

Dec. 8—Czech President Antonin Novotny, at the closing of the party congress, urges the Chinese Communists to end their opposition to Soviet policy. Novotny is re-elected first secretary of the Party. The Congress elects a 9-man presidium, which will replace the Politburo as the top policy-making organ.

### DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, THE

Dec. 16—Juan Bosch, presidential candidate of the left-of-center Dominican Revolutionary party, threatens to withdraw from the electoral race of December 20. He demands that the Roman Catholic Church issue a formal and full retraction of charges of communism levied by individual priests. Last night the Dominican Episcopate issued a statement on the church's "strict neutrality" in politics, but upheld the priests' right to express their opinions.

Dec. 17—Juan Bosch, one of the two leading candidates for the presidency, resigns from the race. Bosch's party asks that the elections be postponed until January.

Dec. 18—Bosch announces that he will continue to run for president.

Dec. 20—The Dominican Republic holds its first free elections for president after over 30 years of dictatorship. Viriato A. Fiallo, candidate of the right-of-center National Civic Union, and Bosch, are the leading candidates.

Dec. 21—Unofficial returns reveal that Juan Bosch has won an absolute majority of the votes.

### FRANCE

Dec. 6—In the newly-elected (in November) National Assembly, the Gaullist majority re-elects Jacques Chaban-Delmas as speaker.

Dec. 12—President de Gaulle and his cabinet approve in principle a bill to establish a new "court for the security of the state." The bill will be sent to the Parliament shortly.

Minister of Culture André Malraux announces that Leonardo da Vinci's painting, "Mona Lisa," will be sent to the U.S. to be exhibited before U.S. audiences.

Dec. 14—Premier Georges Pompidou receives a vote of confidence from the National Assembly for his economic, military, social and political renovation program.

Dec. 16—Talks end between de Gaulle and Macmillan on easing the way for British membership in the E.E.C. It is reported that little progress has been made on the problem of adapting Britain's agricultural system to E.E.C. requirements. (See also *Int'l., E.E.C.*)

Dec. 19—The National Assembly approves the budget for 1963, which amounts to almost \$17 billion.

Dec. 22—It is reported that President de Gaulle, Premier Pompidou and other ministers are studying in secrecy U.S. President Kennedy's offer to give France Polaris missiles if she will cooperate with Britain and the U.S. in an integrated Atlantic nuclear force.

Dec. 31—De Gaulle asks for a West European Union to strike a balance with the U.S.

### GERMANY, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (East)

Dec. 5—*Neues Deutschland* (East German party organ) publishes a December 2 speech by Communist chief Walter Ulbricht. Ulbricht declares that he is willing to compromise on Berlin and Germany in order to effect a peace treaty for Germany.

### GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

Dec. 7—Heinrich von Brentano, parliamentary majority leader of the Christian Democratic Union, announces that Chancellor Konrad Adenauer has agreed to resign in the fall of 1963.

Adenauer and the Free Democratic party reach agreement on re-establishing their coalition government.

Dec. 11—The final make-up of the coalition cabinet is established. There will be 11 Christian Democrats (not including Adenauer), 5 Free Democrats, and 4 Christian Social Union members. Kai Uwe Von Hassell (C.D.U.) is named defense minister, replacing Franz Josef Strauss.

Dec. 28—Adenauer replies to a letter from Soviet Premier Khrushchev delivered yesterday. Adenauer refutes the Soviet accusation that he has helped intensify world tensions. (See also *U.S.S.R.*)

### ITALY

Dec. 2—The 10th Congress of the Communist party of Italy is opened by Palmiro Togliatti.

Dec. 8—The party congress reappoints Togliatti as party secretary. The Central Committee and the Central Control Committee are also reelected.

### JAPAN

Dec. 3—Meeting in Washington, members of the Japanese Cabinet confer with U.S. cabinet members on expanding Japanese trade with the U.S.

### KOREA, SOUTH

Dec. 17—A referendum on a new constitution for Korea is held.

Dec. 18—It is reported that nearly 8 million persons have voted approval for the new constitution, according to almost complete returns. Some 2 million voters disapproved.

Dec. 27—At the court martial of ex-Premier John M. Chang, the prosecution demands a life sentence. Chang is accused of conspiring against the ruling military junta.

### MOROCCO

Dec. 7—A referendum on King Hassan II's proposal for a constitution is held. The draft constitution provides for an elected Chamber of Representatives and strengthens the King's power.

Dec. 8—The National Radio broadcasts the incomplete returns, showing 2,149,235 in

favor of the constitution, and 38,462 opposed.

### PHILIPPINES, THE

Dec. 29—A joint statement issued by the British foreign office reports that Britain and the Philippines will confer on the Southeast Asian situation. The Philippines have voiced a claim to the British protectorate of North Borneo. (See also *British Empire, Malaysia.*)

### POLAND

Dec. 17—The Central Committee of the Communist party convenes in plenary session to decide on new practical goals for science and education.

### PORTUGAL

Dec. 3—Premier Antonio de Oliveira Salazar announces a cabinet reorganization. He resigns from his post as defense minister.

### SPAIN

Dec. 13—*Arriba* (the organ of the Falange, the only legal political group) carries an editorial demanding nationalization of private Spanish banks. This is considered indicative of the Falangist attempt to gain strength by advocating social reform and denouncing the privileged.

Dec. 22—It is reported that the government has decided to increase minimum wages for all workers.

### U.S.S.R.

(See also *Yugoslavia.*)

Dec. 1—A Soviet First Deputy Premier, Anastas I. Mikoyan, leaves Washington after talks with President Kennedy and Dean Rusk on the Cuban situation.

At an exhibition of abstract paintings in the Soviet Union, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev denounces such art.

Dec. 10—In reports to the Supreme Soviet's opening session, Finance Minister Vasily Garbuzov declares that the budget for 1963 will total \$94.7 billion (86.1 billion rubles); about 16 per cent, \$14.3 billion (13.9 billion rubles) will be spent on defense. Veniamin Dymshits, chief economic planner, presents the economic plan for 1963; \$4.5 billion (4.1 billion rubles) will be invested in agri-

culture. Steel production will not be increased at the usual rate of 5-6 million tons; only a 3 million ton increase is planned.

*Pravda* (Communist party newspaper) carries speeches criticizing the Chinese Communists in their ideological dispute with the Soviet Union. For the first time, the Soviet people are told of the conflict.

Dec. 11—The Soviet government announces that a Soviet citizen, O. V. Penkovsky, has been arrested on charges of spying for the U.S. and Britain.

Dec. 12—Khrushchev addresses the Supreme Soviet on the ideological differences in the Communist world. He warns against the left-wing element in the Communist bloc, eager to risk war. He names the Albanians as "dogmatists" directly, and indirectly alludes to the Chinese Communists.

The Supreme Soviet approves the 1963 budget.

Dec. 13—Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko addresses the closing session of the Supreme Soviet, and urges that the Soviet Union and the U.S. improve their relations.

President Tito of Yugoslavia is permitted to address the Supreme Soviet. He declares that "disagreements" between his country and the U.S.S.R. can be healed.

Dec. 14—An aide of the U.S. embassy in Moscow leaves, after having been accused of contact with the Russian spy arrested earlier this week.

Dec. 20—*Tass* (official Soviet press agency) announces that Nikolai G. Ignatov, the head of all agriculture, has been dismissed from a deputy premiership, from the chairmanship of the government's farm products purchasing agency, and from the National Agricultural Committee.

Dec. 22—Valerian A. Zorin is recalled from his post as Soviet representative at the U.N. He will resume his duties as a deputy foreign minister in Moscow.

Dec. 23—President Tito leaves for home after an 18-day visit in the U.S.S.R. Khrushchev announces that he has accepted an invitation from Tito to visit Yugoslavia.

It is reported that the Soviet Union launched Cosmos Twelve yesterday. This is the twelfth satellite to be orbited in the geophysical research series that began in March, 1962.

Dec. 26—The U. S. Atomic Energy Commission announces that in the last 3 days the Soviet Union has tested nuclear weapon in the atmosphere at an Arctic site.

It is reported that the ranking Communist party leaders in the republic of Kazakhstan have been removed because of "poor management."

At the U.N., Zorin is guest of honor at a farewell luncheon. He will be replaced at the U.N. by Nikolai T. Fedorenko, Soviet Far Eastern expert.

Dec. 27—In a letter to West German Chancellor Adenauer made public in Moscow today, Khrushchev urges his assistance in bringing about a settlement in West Berlin. Khrushchev urges that troops under the U.N. flag replace Allied occupation force in West Berlin. (See also *Germany, Federal Republic of*.)

Dec. 29—*Tass* announces that Khrushchev has recently met in Kiev for 2 days with Polish Communist party leader Wladyslaw Gomulka.

## UNITED STATES

### Agriculture

Dec. 11—Orville L. Freeman, Secretary of Agriculture, warns wheat farmers that "utter chaos" will result if they reject the Administration's new wheat control program.

Dec. 13—At the close of its 44th annual meeting, the American Farm Bureau Federation adopts a 10-page set of resolutions opposing most of the Administration's farm program, including the new wheat control plan.

Oren Lee Stanley is re-elected president of the National Farmers Organization.

Dec. 18—The Department of Agriculture reports that the 1962 crop yield matched the record 1960 level on only 88 million harvested acres, the smallest acreage since the Department began to keep records in 1929.

## The Economy

Dec. 5—The Department of Labor reports that the rate of unemployment in November rose to 5.8 per cent of the labor force.

Dec. 14—President Kennedy outlines a program of federal tax reduction and reform for 1963, in a speech to the Economic Club of New York. Specific details as to the amount of tax reduction or the effective date of such reduction are not included.

Dec. 23—The A.F.L.-C.I.O. recommends a \$9 billion cut in taxes on the lowest income brackets, followed by a \$5.5 billion cut in higher income bracket taxes and corporate taxes, plus tax reforms.

## Foreign Policy

Dec. 1—Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs Averell Harriman returns from a trip to Asia.

Anastas I. Mikoyan, a Soviet First Deputy Premier, leaves Washington after a lengthy mission to Cuba, the U.S. and the U.N.

Dec. 3—The Department of Defense reports that Russian jet bombers are being shipped out of Cuba.

White House Press Secretary Pierre Salinger says that Adlai Stevenson "strongly supported" the President's decision to quarantine Cuba. The statement answers a *Saturday Evening Post* article implying friction between Stevenson and the Administration and Administration distrust of Stevenson, the U.S. delegate to the U.N.

Dec. 5—Three days of talks on trade and the fight against communism between U.S. and Japanese Cabinet officials end. A joint communiqué mentions Japan's "serious concern" over some U.S. trade restrictions. (See also *Japan*.)

Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson speaks on foreign policy at West Point. The speech is regarded in Britain as anti-British.

President Kennedy expresses "fullest confidence" in Adlai Stevenson in a letter to the U.N. delegate.

Dec. 10—President Kennedy names Lucius D. Clay to head a bipartisan committee

to study the U.S. foreign aid program.

Secretary of State Dean Rusk says that the Western hemisphere cannot accept as normal "any Soviet military presence in Cuba."

It is reported from Somalia that Louisiana Senator Allen Ellender was refused an entry permit in the Somali Republic and spent 12 hours in the custody of the American charge d'affairs; his entry permit was withdrawn because of hostile remarks he reportedly made about Africans in Salisbury. Ellender has been refused entry also in Tanganyika, Uganda and Ethiopia.

Dec. 11—Meeting in London, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and British Defense Minister Peter Thorneycroft discuss the U.S. decision to abandon the Skybolt missile program. (See also *Military*.)

President Kennedy welcomes Chile's President Jorge Alessandri for a formal state visit.

Dec. 12—Secretary of State Dean Rusk and French President de Gaulle discuss East-West relations and the Cuban crisis in Paris.

Dec. 18—President Kennedy and British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan begin conferences in Nassau.

Dec. 21—After three days of negotiation, Kennedy and Macmillan agree on a plan to set up a "multilateral Nato nuclear force." The U.S. agrees to sell the Polaris submarine-borne missile to Great Britain instead of the Skybolt airborne missile. Britain will build her own submarines. Polaris missile systems will become part of a nuclear Nato force for defense of the Western alliance. (See also *British Commonwealth, Great Britain, and France*.)

Dec. 29—President Kennedy receives the battle flag brought back by the newly-released Cuban invasion troops. In an emotional ceremony in Miami, he calls for a free Cuban government and pledges to return the Cuban battle flag "on Cuban soil."

## Government

Dec. 8—President Kennedy visits the Atomic Energy Commission's nuclear rocket development station in Jackass Flats, Nevada.



Dec. 17—An hour-long pre-taped television interview with President Kennedy is released to three national networks. The President declares that the possibility of Russian-American understanding was decreased by the Cuban crisis.

Dec. 26—In Palm Beach, the President begins to confer on taxes, the budget, education and defense with congressional leaders and with members of his Administration.

Dec. 28—Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Anthony J. Celebrezze names Dr. Frances Oldham Kelsey as head of the new Investigational Drug Branch of the Food and Drug Administration.

### Labor

Dec. 5—The Chicago Federation of Musicians, Local 10, defeats James C. Petrillo for re-election as president, electing instead dance band leader Bernard F. Richards.

Dec. 8—New York's 9 major daily newspapers suspend publication when a contract dispute with their printers results in a strike.

Dec. 23—Longshoremen strike on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts, after the expiration of a Taft-Hartley injunction initiated October 6.

Dec. 26—Federal mediators try again to break the deadlock in the 19-day-old newspaper strike in New York.

Dec. 31—Federal efforts to mediate the longshore strike are recessed until January 2.

### Military

Dec. 6—It is reported from Washington that the Administration plans to abandon work on the Skybolt, an airborne ballistic missile that was planned for use by Britain as well as by the U.S. Air Force. (See also *Foreign Policy*.)

Dec. 13—A relay communication satellite is orbited to link North America, Europe and South America.

Dec. 14—Mariner II takes instrument readings and relays them to earth as it passes 21,100 miles from the surface of Venus.

Dec. 15—The National Aeronautics and Space Administration says the relay communication satellite (Dec. 13) is not functioning successfully.

Dec. 20—The Defense Department yields control of Project Anna, the flashing light geodetic satellite, to the civilian space agency.

Dec. 22—The Skybolt missile is successfully launched from a B-52 bomber. A Nike Zeus anti-missile missile is also successful in intercepting an Atlas ICBM.

Dec. 31—The Defense Department officially orders the orderly phase-out of the Skybolt missile program. (See also *Foreign Policy*.)

### Segregation

Dec. 21—Criminal contempt proceedings are begun against Mississippi Governor Ross R. Barnett and Lieutenant Governor Paul B. Johnson by the Department of Justice.

### VATICAN, THE

Dec. 8—Pope John XXIII formally closes the first phase of the second Vatican ecumenical council. The Council will meet for the second phase on September 8, 1963.

### VIETNAM, SOUTH

Dec. 7—It is reported that for the last 3 days, South Vietnamese troops have been fighting against Vietcong (pro-Communist rebels) in Camau Peninsula.

### YEMEN

Dec. 8—It is reported that mountain tribesmen loyal to Iman Mohamad al-Badr are closing in on Saana, the Yemeni capital.

Dec. 19—The U.S. recognizes the republican government installed in Yemen 12 weeks ago. The revolt was led by Colonel Abdullah al-Salal. U.S. recognition followed a declaration by Yemen that it would honor all of Yemen's international obligations, and a declaration by the United Arab Republic that it would withdraw its 12,000 troops supporting the republican cause.

### YUGOSLAVIA

Dec. 2—President Tito departs for a visit to the Soviet Union. (See also *U.S.S.R.*)

Dec. 4—Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev welcomes Tito in Moscow. Khrushchev, in a speech, says the two leaders can strengthen their "friendship and cooperation."

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